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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important yet insufficiently researched dynamics of the 
European Union (EU) concerns its effectiveness in accommodating the security 
concerns of its members. With NATO dominating the collective security market of 
the old continent, the launch of the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) in 1999 generated an interesting security option and silently partitioned 
the NATO members of the EU into a “euro-atlanticist” and a “euro-continentalist” 
group, with the nonduplication of NATO being the point of contention. With 
Greece’s major security concern deriving from Turkey, a fellow NATO member, 
Athens holds a firm position in the latter group, seeking to turn the evolving 
European defense project into a counterweight to NATO in guaranteeing Greek 
national security. While Greek security priorities have remained remarkably 
consistent, the ambitious European defense project has undergone various 
fluctuations, reflecting the awkward development in its evolution. As a 
consequence, Greece’s anticipations of a CSDP commitment in its national 
security concerns have oscillated accordingly: periods of positive signs 
succeeded periods of disillusionment, and vice versa. Against this background, 
this paper attempts to elucidate Greek perceptions of its security providers and 
aims to give an answer to the following question: Are Greek security concerns 
reflected in the CSDP? In other words, is the EU an adequate security provider 
for Greece? This thesis argues that the territorial security concerns of the EU’s 
member-states, especially those of Greece, cannot be fully assuaged under the 
CSDP auspices. More specifically, the CSDP does not adequately address 
Greek national interests, if defending these interests entails a European military 
response. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
One of the most important yet insufficiently researched dynamics of the 
European Union (EU) concerns the organization’s effectiveness in 
accommodating the security concerns of its members. With the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization dominating the collective-security market of the old 
continent, the launch of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)1 in 
1999 was greeted differently within the EU family, ultimately partitioning 
members into a “euro-atlanticist” and a “euro-continentalist” group, with the 
primacy of NATO as the point of contention.2 With Greece’s major security 
concern deriving from Turkey, a fellow NATO member, Athens holds a firm 
position in the second group, seeking to turn the evolving European defense 
project into a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
guaranteeing Greek national security.  
While Greece’s expectations regarding the CSDP have remained 
unaltered, the dynamics of the CSDP have fluctuated, reflecting the awkward 
developments in its evolution.3 As a consequence, Greece’s expectations of the 
CSDP’s commitment to its national security concerns oscillated accordingly: 
Periods of positive signs succeeded spells of disillusionment until the cycle 
                                            
1 It was the Lisbon Treaty that renamed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The ESDP was the successor of the 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the 
jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including countries with no ties to NATO. 
2 For more on the Atlanticist and the Continentalist states within the EU and their position 
regarding NATO, see Arunas Molis, “The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing 
European Security and Defence Policy,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 2006, no. 8, ed. 
Tomas Jermalavicius (2006): 86. 
3 For more on the evolution of the CSDP, see the comprehensive work of Jolyon Howorth in  
Security and Defense Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Sven 
Biscop and Franco Algieri, “The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and Integration,” in 
Egmont Papers 24, eds. Sven Biscop and Franco Algieri (Brussels: Academia Press, 2008). The 
fluctuation between expectations and reality regarding the dynamics of ESDP is discussed in 
Henry Bentegeat, “ESDP: What Added Value in a Crisis Management,” in Athen '09 Conference 
(Athens (EL), 2009). 
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started again. Are Greek security concerns reflected in the CSDP? In other 
words, is the EU an adequate security provider for Greece? The main argument 
of this paper is that the territorial security concerns of the EU’s member states, 
let alone Greece, cannot be fully assuaged under the CSDP auspices. More 
specifically, the CSDP does not adequately address Greek national interests, if 
defending these interests entails a European military response. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
From the early development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
to the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),4 which 
provided the overarching framework under which the CSDP was established, 
member-state policies have followed a process of adaptation to a structure of 
common approaches that has allowed for enhanced cooperation. Although the 
pace and extent of this adaptation process has been relatively high in the 
economic and political fields, the security realm lags demonstrably. The relevant 
literature asserts that the basic element that hinders common European security 
thinking is that the degree to which this adaptation process is influenced by the 
differing threat perceptions that each state holds for itself versus the spectrum of 
threats that the CSDP undertakes to address collectively.5 As Morten Kelstrup 
suggests, this observation is particularly valid for small states (such as Greece), 
which, “[being] not in command of power resources sufficient to pursue dominant 
power politics” within the EU, lack the comparative capacity to project their 
national security priorities, however pressingly felt, at the CSDP level.6 
                                            
4 The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced in 1970 and was the synonym 
for EU foreign policy coordination until it was superseded by the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of November 1, 1993. The CFSP itself has its origins in 
the formation of the EPC. 
5 Jolyon Howorth, “Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP,” Policy Paper No 
7 ( Notre Europe), November 2003; also Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European 
Union.  
6 For a comprehensive analysis see Morten Kelstrup, “Small States and European Political 
Integration: Reflections on Theory and Strategy,” in The Nordic Countries and the EC, vol. 4  of 
CORE Research Series, ed. Teija Tiilikainen and Damgaard Ib. Petersen (Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1993). 
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With the examination of the Greek case, this thesis intends to test the 
validity of what Tsakonas and Tournikiotis identified as “the reality-expectations 
gap”—that is, the gap between Athens’ expectations of its security providers and 
their security providers’ effectiveness in addressing these expectations. In the 
process, the present work draws some conclusions about whether smaller states 
just have to accept a certain disconnect between what they want and what they 
get out of alliances—and, as a corollary, whether the big states run the risk of 
losing their smaller partners. Within this context, the importance of the research 
question derives from both the theoretical and practical approach to the problem. 
From a theoretical standpoint, this thesis will distinguish between the indicators 
that measure the success or failure of “security communities”7 in reconciling their 
members’ respective concerns. From a practical vantage, it suggests some 
models for states that seek to effectively safeguard their national security 
interests within collective security structures.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Within the broader context of Greece’s security policy, the following 
components can be identified: 
1. A problematic relationship with fellow NATO member Turkey, the 
implications of which reach well beyond simple inter-state frictions. 
In the context of its disputes with Greece, Turkey uses its 
membership in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to block the “Berlin 
Plus” process, whereby the EU might have access to NATO military 
                                            
7 Term coined by the prominent political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Political 
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical 
Experience (New York , NY: Archon Books, 1957). Deutsch was, of course, writing about formal 
alliances; however, his theory is by nature applicable to entities such as the EU, which, albeit not 
an alliance, aspires a security and defense role. 
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assets and structure.8 The shift of the Greco-Turkish tension from 
the bilateral to the international level, de facto renders the Greek 
case a vital link in the CSDP evolution chain because, unless the 
EU obtains autonomous military capabilities or Turkey withdraws its 
veto, the ambitions for a strong CSDP could be permanently 
jeopardized. 
2. An exposed geographical location in the Balkans, as well as the 
fact that Greece is not connected by land to any other EU 
countries, except for Bulgaria.9 Both these elements contribute to 
Greece’s insecurity, as all the country’s Balkan neighbors are still 
undergoing a period of political and economic transition that, in the 
words of Thanos Dokos “could spin out of control under certain 
circumstances.”10 Such issues as border security, refugees, and 
irredentism well may eventuate, especially in the aftermath of the 
recent Balkan wars, which, to a great extent, (re)generated the 
economic stagnation and ethnic tensions in the area. 
3. A strategic history as a small state amid great-power antagonisms. 
Located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia, and 
Africa) and situated in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-
rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus, the modern 
Greek state has, since its establishment in 1830, been—and to a 
certain extent still is—subject to foreign intervention in its domestic 
                                            
8 “The “Berlin Plus” arrangements refer to the agreed framework in the NATO-EU 
cooperation in crisis management operations. Under these arrangements, the EU enjoys 
“assured access to NATO’s planning,” “presumed access to NATO’s assets and capabilities,” and 
a pre-designed European-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), a European General, in: Howorth, Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim 
Assessment of ESDP, 102. 
9 Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are not currently EU 
member-states. 
10 Thanos A. Dokos, “Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Greece and the 
new Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities, vol. VI in Modern Greek Research Series (New 
York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999), 239–264. 
 5
affairs.11 As a consequence, national policies have occasionally 
been shaped more in accordance with foreign aims than with Greek 
national interests.  
As entrenched and central as these Greek security concerns are, 
however, the most fundamental problem for advancing them on the CSDP level 
seems to be that the national interests of EU members diverge, or even conflict, 
in certain areas.12 The 1999 Balkan wars, where the Franco-German dispute 
limited a unified European armed response, provides an eloquent example of the 
EU’s lack of a common security orientation. Within this organizational, political, 
and historical problems, Athens finds itself dependent on alliance structures that, 
to Greek eyes, address imperfectly its national security priorities. 
The hypothesis of this study is that Greece’s reality-expectations gap 
regarding the CSDP is shaped by two major elements. The first pertains to the 
distinctiveness of the Greek security concerns, that is, the aspects of the Greek 
security environment that the rest of the EU member-states do not share. The 
second refers to the potential of the CSDP itself, namely its conceptual and 
structural limits as a whole. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The quest for an autonomous EU policy covering defense and military 
aspects has received significant scholarly attention; however, the existing 
analyses approach the issue from a collective perspective and not from the 
                                            
11 George Stergiou Kaloudis, Modern Greece, A Partner or Still a Client? (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group—University Press of America, 2002). For a historical 
analysis on the foreign interference in Greece, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. 
Petropoulos and Harry J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical 
Perspective, vol. II of Modern Greek Research Series, ed. Theodore A. Couloumbis et al. (New 
York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976). 
12 In a similar manner, Constantine Stephanopoulos asserted that: “National aims are still 
pursued at the expense of common European aims, and the divergent interests of the member-
states often come into conflict,” in Constantine Stephanopoulos, “Issues of Greek Foreign Policy,” 
in The Greek Paradox- Promise vs. Prerformance, ed. Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nikolaidis 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 135–143. 
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member-state’s point of view. For example, such analysts as Tamir Sinai,13 
Trevor Salmon and Alistair Shepherd,14 Frédéric Mérand,15 and Jolyon 
Howorth16 provide useful insights on the potential and dynamics of the European 
security project, but their research views the CSDP from the EU angle. A solid 
analysis of the role of EU integration in shaping its members’ defense policies is 
provided in an earlier work of Jolyon Howorth with Anand Menon;17 however, 
apart from well out of date,18 their study does not include small member-states. 
Subsequent studies of the EU’s quest for security and defense autonomy 
followed along the same line, analyzing the impact of the CSDP either as a sole 
actor within the EU19 or from the security standpoint of one or more of the “Big 
Three”: Britain, France, and Germany.20 The only scholarly efforts addressing the 
effect of the CSDP on the individual EU member-states’ security were part of 
broader projects, seeking to identify converging security interests within 
geographic or territorial-populace contexts—thus unavoidably downplaying the 
                                            
13 Tamir M. A. Sinai, The Common European Security and Defence Capability: The Creation 
of a ‘Holistic’ Security Actor (Munchen: GRIN Verlag, 2008). 
14 Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J.K Shepherd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power 
in the Making? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003). 
15 Frédéric Mérand, European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
16 Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?, vol. 43 of 
Chaillot Papers (Paris: Institute for Security Studies- Western European Union, 2000); also 
Howorth Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, and Howorth, Saint-Malo Plus Five: 
An Interim Assessment of ESDP.  
17 To provide an insight into the different national factors that condition the impact of EU 
action, the authors dedicate the second part of their book to the four larger member-states: 
France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. For more, see: Jolyon Howorth and Anan Menon, , The 
European Union and National Defence Policy, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Anan Menon (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1997). 
18 Their work was published two years prior to the launch of the CSDP; Ibid. 
19 Francois Heisbourg, “European Security: The Impact of the European's Security and 
Defense Policy,” vol. 7 in Coping with the New Security Challenges of Europe (Zurich: Center for 
Security Studies (CSS), 2001), 45–60. 
20 Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defence in the European Union (Basingston, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006); Lars Zimmermann, “Britain, France and Germany: Priorities for the European's Union 
Security and Defense Policy,” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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national perspective for the sake of focusing on the group under examination.21 
Although the road from Saint-Malo via Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, and Laeken to 
Skopje and Bunya is well known, neither specialists in security issues nor 
scholars of European integration have been able to put forth a comprehensive 
research agenda concerning the benefits of the CSDP from the member-state 
point of view.  
An analogous gap exists in the literature dealing with Greek security 
apprehensions. Athens’ security policy is extensively discussed by Athanasios 
Dokos,22 Yannis Vallinakis,23 Athanasios Platias,24 Alexis Heraclides,25 
Moustakis and Sheehan,26 and Dimitri Constas and Charalampos Papasotiriou,27 
but their research aims at elucidating its elements—especially in the context of 
the tensions with Turkey—and not the role of the EU in supporting it. A more 
comprehensive view of Greek security issues is presented in the papers of 
Monteagle Stearns28 and Stephen Larrabee,29 but even their analyses, although 
                                            
21 For a geographical approach, see: Klaus (ed) Brummer, The South and ESDP: Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, Discussion Paper, Center for Applied Policy Research (Münich: 
Bertelsman Stiftung & Bertelsman Group for Policy Research, 2007). A comprehensive analysis 
in territorial- populace terms is provided in: Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, Small States in 
Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2010); also 
in Molis, The Role and Interests of Small Small States in Developing European Security and 
Defense Policy. 
22 Dokos,  Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era. 
23 Yannis Vallinakis, Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Ebenhausen: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994). 
24 Athanasios G. Platias, “Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and 
Deterrence,” in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences 
(London: Macmillan, 1991), 91–108. 
25 Alexis Heraclides, Η Ελλάδα και ο “Εξ Ανατολών Κίνδυνος” (Greece and the “Danger from 
the East” abridged translation), 2nd ed. (Athens, Attiki: Polis, 2001). 
26 Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 3 (2000): 95–115. 
27 Dimitri Constas and Charalambos Papasotiriou, “Greek Policy Responses to the Post-
Cold War Balkan Environment,” in Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities, 
vol. VI in Modern Greek Research Series (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999), 213–237. 
28 Monteagle Stearns, “Greek Security Issues,” in The Greek Paradox (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1997), 61–72. 
29 Stephen F. Larrabee, “Greece & the Balkans: Implications for Policy,” in The Greek 
Paradox: Promise vs. Performance (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 107–112. 
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thorough in specifying all elements that accentuate Greece’s insecurity, does not 
address the role of the CSDP in assuaging it.  There is some scholarly work 
linking the two variables together, but it approaches the EU in its political 
dimensions and not as a reliable security provider in the old-fashioned 
conception of defense. In fact, “plain old defense” rarely registers in scholarship 
studying the post-Cold War security environment.  For example, the works of 
Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris Passas;30 and Kevin Featherstone and 
George Kazamias,31 although pioneering in analyzing the relationship between 
Greece and the EU, conceptualize security in the context of the economic-
political benefits deriving from EU membership. In their more narrowly focused 
analyses, Ioannis Grigoriadis32 and Ronald Meinardus33 deplore the role of the 
European factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle, but their views also 
exclude the CSDP pillar.  
In sum, despite the volume of academic work dealing individually with 
either the CSDP, or Greece’s security profile, the association between them has 
been neither systematically nor cumulatively researched. This thesis undertakes 
to fill this lacuna and establish just what the CSDP means to Greece and, by 
implication, what modern alliances do for, to, and about small states today. It 
analyzes in detail the security perceptions that the Greek state holds for itself and 
the respective areas that the CSDP covers or fails to address.  
                                            
30 Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas, Greece in the European Union 
(Europe and the Nation State) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005).  
31 Kevin Featherstone and George A. Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern 
Periphery  (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001). 
32 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations,” 
in Hellenic Observatory–1st PHD Symposium on Modern Greece (London: European Institute 
LSE, 2003). 
33 Ronald Meinardus, “Third Party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes,” in The Greek-
Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, 157–163 (Basingstoke , 
Hampshire: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991). 
 9
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In effect, this thesis presents its findings through a case study of Greece, 
specifically the security domain of Greek foreign policy.  To this end, it 
synthesizes literature from several fields: security and defense planning, 
comparative politics, defense economics, and international relations. To analyze 
Athens’ contemporary security apprehensions, the causal mechanisms of each 
major concern or consideration are presented within their broader historical 
context, that is, in tandem with a socio-political analysis. Relevant scholarly effort 
by security analysts and official statements by diplomats and high-ranking 
statesmen provide additional insights. By identifying the reasons behind Greek 
insecurity, even within the EU, and evaluating the potential of the ambitious 
European security project, the present study lays bare the areas of strategic 
convergence or divergence between Athens’ concerns on the one side and the 
CSDP’s assurances on the other. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The paper commences its analysis with an overview of Athens’ threat 
perceptions. Detailing Greece’s security environment in Chapter II, it tests the 
first hypothesis element—that is, the particularity of Greek concerns—and 
concludes that Athens’ major security apprehensions are, contrary to the 
European norm, territorial in nature, with Turkey chief among them. On the basis 
of these territorial concerns, Chapter III elucidates Athens’ disappointment with 
the security mechanisms in which it has participated so far, namely NATO and, 
until its recent demise, the Western European Union (WEU).34 Placing the 
analysis in its historical context, Chapter III demonstrates that Greece’s skeptical 
attitude toward its security guarantors has been determined by their actions—and 
inactions—regarding Turkish-Greek tensions. In doing so, it provides the basic 
framework for comprehending Greece’s support and expectations of the CSDP. 
Chapter IV addresses the evolution of the CSDP and its potential in covering 
                                            
34 The WEU’s activities ceased in June 2011. 
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Greek territorial insecurities. To test the validity of the second hypothesis 
element, Chapter IV examines the conceptual and structural characteristics of 
the CSDP. It argues that, contrary to a promising defense dimension, ambitiously 
proclaimed within its very acronym, not only is CSDP not a defense alliance, but 
it also does not aspire to become one. Chapter V wraps up the data of the 
previous chapters and concludes that the current CSDP structure will only deal 
with the Greek case if its involvement does not stipulate a European military 
response to its territorial issues. 
 11
II. GREEK SECURITY CONCERNS 
History may not repeat itself, but it sure teaches us lessons. We 
should learn from our past experiences and set our priorities right. 
At this moment, our country faces three open fronts: Albania, 
Skopje, and Turkey.35  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In their assessment of the post Cold-War security priorities of Greece, four 
distinguished Greek diplomats identified their country’s three major security 
concerns to be Albania, FYROM, and Turkey. Despite the obvious differences in 
population size, economic power, and military strength compared to each other 
and to Greece, these three states bear a common characteristic: the insecurities 
that they cause to Athens are, contrary to the European norm, territorial in 
nature.36 In other words, Greece feels that its internationally accepted territory is 
being challenged by Albania, FYROM, and Turkey. Although the magnitude of 
the perceived threats deriving from the former two states is evaluated by Greek 
officials as controllable, if not negligible, the same assessment does not apply to 
Turkey, which outnumbers Greece in both population and military size.37 The 
Turkish factor is critical in understanding the security mentality of Greece, and 
consequently the perceptions that Greece holds for its security providers: Turkey 
is not only greater in absolute numbers, but also, by being a NATO member, it 
co-exists, at times tendentiously, with Greece in the very organization that 
Athens has chosen as the guarantor for its collective defense. 
Along with the territorial concerns that Greece seeks to address within 
collective defense schemes, there is an extra parameter that occupies Greek 
                                            
35  Efstathios Lagakos et al., Skepseis kai Provlimatismoi gia tin Exoteriki Politiki [Thoughts 
and Concerns on Foreign Policy–abridged translation], in Occasional Paper, no. 1, ELIAMEP 
(Athens: Sideris Publishers, 1995), 1. 
36 With the exception of Finland and its perceptions of Russia, Greece is the only EU 
member-state whose major security interests are territorial. 
37 The population of Turkey is approximately 75 million people compared to 12 million in 
Greece, and its military is the second largest in NATO with 402,000 personnel.  
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security thinking: the issue of illegal immigration, which has developed a 
significant security dimension, especially during the last 15–20 years. The 
uncontrollable waves of illegal immigrants stretch the Greek capacity to 
organically integrate the newcomers into the existing domestic structures. The 
issue is not of Greek interest only; however, due to its geographical position at 
the southeastern border of Europe, Greece ultimately functions as the gateway 
for immigrants wishing to enter the EU territory, mainly through the Greek-
Turkish borders near Evros river.  
In this context, Chapter II explores the distinctiveness of the security 
concerns of Athens, compared to its EU counterparts. The analysis demonstrates 
that Ankara is Athens first security priority as, along with the territorial threat it 
poses to Greece, it is also interlinked to the non-territorial issue of illegal 
immigration.  
B. THE “THREAT FROM THE EAST” 
Although the end of the Second World War and entry into NATO initiated a 
promising period of collaboration between Greece and Turkey, the issue of the 
Cyprus’s status was reflected in bilateral relations, even as far back as the early 
1950s. Paying the price of Turkish reaction to the struggle of the Greek-Cypriots, 
on 6 September 1955, an organized attack on ethnic Greek residents of 
Constantinople, ended in numerous casualties and extensive damage to Greek 
property;38 this pogrom led to the gradual departure of ethnic Greeks, a process 
that culminated in 1964, with the official deportation of the Greek community.39  
The Turkish invasion and military occupation of Cyprus in 1974, and the 
following unilateral extension of Turkey’s air traffic area of responsibility up to the 
                                            
38 For a detailed discussion, see Spyros Jr. Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The 
Turkish Pogrom Of September 6–7, 1955, And The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of 
Istanbul (New York: Greekworks.com, 2005); Also, Christoforos I. Christidis, Ta Septemvriana- 
Constantinople and Smyrni 1955, Contribution to the Recent History of the Greek Communities- 
abridged translation (Athens, Attiki: Kentro Mikrasitikon Spoudon, 2000). 
39 By secret decision (6/3801) made by the Turkish Ministerial Council on November 2, 
1964, all real property belonging to Greeks was attacked and Greeks were barred from legal 
transactions involving the transfer of property. 
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middle of the Aegean, asserted Turkish aggressiveness and re-orientated the 
Greek security doctrine from the “menace from the North”40 to a “threat from the 
East.”41 The two countries have been brought to the brink of armed conflict twice 
since then: in March 1987, when Turkish attempts to conduct underwater 
research on the Greek continental shelf prompted a full deployment of the Greek 
armed forces; and in January 1996, when Turkey’s challenges of Greek 
sovereignty over the islets of Imia escalated in military mobilization from both 
countries. The latter crisis was only defused with the intervention of the United 
States. However, Athens’ concerns had been triggered even before the Imia 
crisis. In 1995, Turkey raised an official casus belli in the event of Greece 
exercising its right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles 
from the coastline.42  
Such concerns were validated after the disclosure of the Turkish 
operational plans “Balyoz” and “Suga” on January 2010.  According to these 
plans, the Turkish armed forces were planning the creation and escalation of a 
military crisis with Greece, which, revealing the incompetence of the Turkish 
civilian government, would justify its overthrow by the military and the 
subsequent invasion of Greek territory in Thrace and the Aegean.43 Although the 
Turkish military officers involved in the planning are currently facing charges for 
attempting to overthrow the government, Turkey continues to challenge 
established Greek sovereignty over the Aegean. 
                                            
40 Term coined in the context of the Truman Doctrine to illustrate the communist threat; see 
Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Explaining an Activist Military: Greece until 1975,” Southeast European 
Politics VI, no. 1 (2005), 8. 
41 Dokos, Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 245.  
42 Territorial waters give the littoral state full control over air navigation in the airspace above, 
and partial control over shipping (foreign ships, both foreign and military are normally guaranteed 
the right of innocent passage. As a signatory member of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III), Greece reserves the right to claim a twelve nautical mile limit. 
43 “Darbenin Adi Balyoz” Taraf- Dusunmek Taraf Olmaktir, January 20, 2010. 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/darbenin-adi-balyoz.htm (accessed January 15, 2011). 
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With the political issue of Cyprus maintaining its shadow on bilateral 
relations, the points of friction between the two countries can be summarized as 
follows:   
 Greece’s sovereignty over a number of islands, islets, and atolls in 
the Eastern Aegean 
 Greek territorial waters  
 National Airspace and Athens’ Flight International Region (FIR) 
 Military status of the Aegean islands 
 Continental shelf 44 
1. Greece’s Sovereignty Over a Number of Islands, Islets and 
Atolls in the Eastern Aegean 
Although Turkish claims on the sovereignty of the islands of the Aegean 
Sea were not systemized until after the Imia crisis of 1996, official statements 
following the invasion of Cyprus were for Athens the first signals of Ankara’s 
revisionist aims. Asserting the centrality of Cyprus in achieving these aims, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel declared in 1975: 
In the Aegean, one must necessarily pursue a dynamic policy. The 
conditions today are different from the conditions in 1923. Turkey's 
power has grown. When we talk of the need for dynamic policy, we 
do not mean that the army must act at once and that we should 
occupy the islands. Our financial interests need to be safeguarded 
in the Aegean. Cyprus is the first step towards the Aegean. 
(Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel, January 22, 1975)45 
 
                                            
44 Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relationships-Potentials with Turkey,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: Greece in the World, accessed February 24, 2011, 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South 
Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Differences/. 
45 Cited in Stergios Tsilikas, “Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and its 
Implications on Greek-Turkish Relations” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 17. 
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Successive statements by leading Turkish political figures have been 
viewed with analogous alarm: 
The group of islands situated near the Turkish coasts, including the 
Dodecanese, must belong to Turkey. Among these we cite 
Samothrace, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos, Rhodes, and all others, 
small or large within a distance of 50 km. (Vice-Premier Mr. Turkes, 
March 3, 1976)46 
Other assertions include, “Do not call these islands Greek islands but 
Aegean islands. It is preferable to call them Aegean islands.” (Turkish Prime 
Minister, Süleyman Demirel, August 19, 1976)47 and “For six hundred years the 
Aegean islands were ours and in the hands of the Ottomans” (Turkish Prime 
Minister, Süleyman Demirel, August 24, 1976).48  
Greek security analysts’ assessment of Ankara’s intentions were 
confirmed in 1996, when Turkish challenges over the sovereignty of the islets of 
Imia developed into a general questioning of Greek rule on a number of islands, 
islets, and atolls of the eastern Aegean, formally known as the “grey zone 
theory.”49 The unfolding of events that led to the Imia crisis is of specific 
importance as, for the first time after the invasion in Cyprus, it confirmed Greek 
concerns of Turkish intentions to use military force at an opportune moment. 
On December 26, 1995, a Turkish freighter ran aground on one of the 
islets of Imia, and its captain initially declined the assistance offered by the Greek 
authorities, claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters.  Ultimately he 
accepted the offer to be towed to Turkey by a Greek tugboat, but a dispute over 
the salvage fees between the Turkish freighter captain and the Greek tug captain 
                                            
46 Cited in Tsilikas, Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and its Implications 
on Greek-Turkish Relations, 17. 
47 Cited in: Stergios Arapoglou, Dispute in the Aegean Sea- The Imia/Kardak Crisis, 
Research Report, Air Command and Staff College Air University (Alabama: Maxwell Airforce 
Base, 2002), 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 According to this theory, Turkish diplomats claim that several islets, while not explicitly 
retained under Turkish sovereignty in 1923, were also not explicitly ceded to any other country, 
and their sovereignty has therefore remained objectively undecided. 
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led the former to submit a routine request to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, asking to whom the Imia belong. This Turkish inquiry into Greek territory 
was picked up by the Greek media, and the mayor of a nearby Greek island 
sailed to Imia and raised a Greek flag on his own initiative, in order to stress that 
the islets are Greek territory. On 27 January 1996, a team of journalists from the 
Turkish newspaper Hurriet rented a helicopter, flew to Imia, removed the Greek 
flag and replaced it with a Turkish for the benefit of the cameras of a private 
Turkish television channel. The following day the Greek Navy lowered the 
Turkish flag and hoisted the Greek standard. Turkey responded by concentrating 
warships in the sea around Imia, violating Greek territorial waters.  The Turkish 
provocation culminated in the landing of Turkish troops on the second islet, 
which, for all intents, was a militarily occupation of Greek territory.  Several days 
later, after the intervention of the United States, both sides agreed to withdraw 
their forces from the area and not raise flags on the islets again, for the purposes 
of de-escalating the crisis.50 
In the aftermath of this event, the Turkish foreign ministry verbally 
stressed Turkish sovereignty over the Imia islets and demanded—in practical 
application of the grey zone theory—wholesale negotiations on the islands, islets, 
and atolls in the Aegean, maintaining that their status is legally undetermined:51 
Turkey said from the beginning that the issue was not merely the 
ownership for Imia (Kardak) rocks, which Turkey claims as its own 
under international law. There are hundreds of little islands, islets 
and rocks in the Aegean that their status remains unclear, due to 
the absence of a comprehensive bilateral agreement between the 
two countries. (Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Omer Akbel, 
January 31, 1996)52 
                                            
50 “No troops, no ships, no flags,” quoted from: Christos Lymberis, Poreia se Taragmenes 
Thalasses [Navigation Through Rough Seas–abridged translation] (Vari, Attiki: Poiotita, 1999), 
538. 
51 A comprehensive analysis of the Turkish and Greek views on the legal issues regarding 
the sovereignty over the islets, is provided on the websites of the respective Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs. [www.mfa.gov.tr for Turkey, and www.mfa.gr for Greece]. 
52 Cited in: Tsilikas, Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and its Implications 
on Greek-Turkish Relations, 17. 
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2. Greek Territorial Waters  
With both countries maintaining a six-mile territorial sea limit since 1936, 
the actual conflict over territorial waters emerged when proposals about 
extending its breadth to twelve miles were submitted during the first United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS I) in 1958.53 Fearing that 
potential use of such a right on the Greek islands would essentially turn the 
Aegean into a Greek lake,54 Turkish statements explicitly stressed that an 
extension would lead to war: 
It has often been said that should Greece attempt to extend her 
territorial waters to twelve miles Turkey would consider this act as a 
cause for war. Greece would not risk such a thing. (Message from 
the Turkish Foreign Minister I. Caglayangil to the Greek Premier, 
Constantine Karamanlis, October 24, 1979)55 
The issue officially entered the Greek-Turkish agenda after November 
1994, with the entry into force of UNCLOS III, which would formalize the twelve-
mile limit as the maximum breadth of a State’s territorial Sea.56 As signatory 
member of the convention, the Greek Parliament ratified UNCLOS III on May 31, 
1995, reserving its conventional right to make use of the relevant provision. In 
response, on June 8, 1995, the Turkish Parliament raised an official casus belli 
and authorized its government to take any necessary measures, including 
military ones, if Greece exercised its right. Subsequent Turkish statements 
                                            
53 The first conference, held in 1958, produced four treaties: on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, on the Continental Shelf, on the High Seas, and on Fishing and the 
Conservation of Living Resources on the High Seas. That conference, however, could not reach 
agreement on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea or the seaward extent of national 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The second conference, held in 1960, aimed to standardize 
the breadth of the territorial sea, but also failed to reach an agreement, mainly because the 
United States and other maritime countries refused to countenance a territorial sea broader than 
six miles. 
54 See maps, p. 18–19. 
55 Cited in: Arapoglou, Dispute in the Aegean Sea–The Imia/Kardak Crisis, 13. 
56 Part II, Section II article 3 of UNCLOS III in: United Nations-Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Seas, “Oceans and Law of the Seas,” United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea- Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm (accessed 27 
February 2011). 
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underlined Ankara’s determination to go to war over the depth of the Greek 
islands’ territorial sea: “Turkey would seriously consider seizing some of the 
Greek islands close to the Turkish mainland” (Commander of the Turkish Naval 
Forces, Admiral Govan Erkaya).57 
Turkey maintains the position that extension of the territorial seas is 
unacceptable as all shipping to and from Turkey’s Aegean ports and, indeed, that 
any transiting of the Turkish straits to and from the Black Sea requires one to 
pass through Greek territorial waters. Pointing out that Turkey itself has extended 
its territorial seas to twelve nautical miles off its Black Sea and Mediterranean 
coasts, Athens stresses the fact that the navigation rights, covered by the right of 
“innocent passage” laid down in the 1982 UN Convention, would not be 
threatened by an extension of Greek territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. As 
the breadth of the territorial waters impacts the ownership claims of the 
continental shelf beneath them and the airspace above them, Greek security 
analysts consider this challenge part of Ankara’s overall revisionist aspirations in 
the Aegean. 
 
Figure 1.   Current Territorial Sea Distribution in the Aegean (six nautical 
miles).58  
                                            
57 Cited in Arapoglou, Dispute in the Aegean Sea–The Imia-Kardak Crisis, 9. 
58 Pratt, Martin, and Clive Schofield. “The Imia Dispute in the Aegean Sea.” IBRU Boundary 
and Security Bulletin, Spring 1996, 64. 
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Figure 2.   Possible Territorial Sea Distribution in the Aegean (twelve nautical 
miles).59  
3. National Airspace—Athens Flight International Region (FIR) 
Greek national airspace is established with the Presidential Decree June 
18, 1931, which maintains a coastal zone of ten nautical miles serving aviation 
and air policing requirements.60 As with territorial seas, Turkey rejects any 
suggestion that Greek national airspace extends beyond six nautical miles from 
its coasts in the Aegean; in fact, although Turkey recognized and respected the 
above rule of ten nautical miles for forty-four consecutive years, since 1975 it 
contests it with persistent violations of Greek airspace: Turkish fighter planes, 
often armed with missiles, not only violate the section of Greek air space 
contested by Turkey between ten and six nautical miles, but also penetrate 
deeply beyond six nautical miles, sometimes overflying Greek islands; in other 
words they enter portions of Greek air space which Turkey has recognized. 
The conflict over the national airspace is linked to airspace jurisdiction 
(FIR) as it constitutes part of the latter. The legal framework ruling international 
aviation in the Aegean was set in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)—to which both countries had been party—which ruled that 
                                            
59 Martin and Schofield, The Imia Dispute in the Aegean Sea, 64. 
60 Presidential Decree 6/18 of 1931 on the “Determination of the Extent of Territorial Waters 
for Aviation and Air Policing Requirements,” Government Gazette A/ 325. 
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except for a narrow strip of national airspace along the Turkish coast, 
responsibility for Aegean airspace should fall to the Athens FIR. 
In August 1974, Turkey issued Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714, 
unilaterally extending its area of responsibility up to the middle of the Aegean, 
refusing, from that point on, to report the flight schedules of its military aircraft to 
Athens FIR. Athens responded with the issuing of NOTAM 1157, which declared 
the Aegean air routes to Turkey unsafe due to the conflicting orders. In 1980, 
Turkey withdrew its demand and immediately afterwards Greece recalled its 
notification as well. However, Ankara’s refusal to submit the flight plans of its 
military aircraft continued uninterrupted, resulting in Greek aircrafts being 
scrambled to intercept and identify Turkish military flights over the Aegean. 
Additional diplomatic initiatives undermining Greek jurisdiction on the Aegean 
were taken in 1989 with the entry into (domestic) force of an arbitrary Turkish law 
establishing a Turkish Search and Rescue (SAR) area of responsibility that 
includes a large part of the Black Sea, half of the Aegean, and a part of the 
eastern Mediterranean that included the militarily occupied northern part of 
Cyprus.61 
4. Military Status of the Aegean Islands 
The status of the majority of the Greek and Turkish islands and coastal 
areas was initially set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which not only settled 
sovereignty issues, but also demilitarized most of them, with the exception of 
police forces, gendarmerie, etc. The following Treaty of Montreaux (1936), which 
revised the Treaty of Lausanne, allowed the partial remilitarization of certain 
islands near the Dardanelles (Limnos and Samothraki). Similarly, restrictions on 
the militarization of the Dodecanese islands were included in the provisions of 
the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. In the aftermath of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in  
 
 
                                            
61 The law was published in the Turkish Government Gazette on January 7, 1989.  
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1974, fearing another possible Turkish invasion, Greece subsequently 
remilitarized both sets of islands, citing its right to self-defense under the United 
Nations (UN) Charter Article 51.  
The remilitarization of the islands was used as a justification for the 
formation, in 1975, of Turkey’s Fourth Army, the so-called “Army of the Aegean,” 
deployed in southwestern Anatolia. This force is not assigned to NATO and is 
equipped with the largest non-ocean-going landing force in the world.62 Coupled 
with its amphibious capabilities, and in close proximity to Greece’s outermost 
islands, the Fourth Army has proved a source of great concern to Athens and 
has provided a rationale for reinforcing Greek forces there as a first line of 
defense against Turkish attack.63 Also standing by Article 51, Ankara claims that 
the IVth army constitutes a protective shield against attack from fortified Greek 
islands just a few hundred meters from the Turkish mainland. The real 
dimensions of the issue, though, are arguably best highlighted by Monteagle 
Stearns:  
Whether the Turkish Fourth Army numbers 30,000 troops, as the 
Turks claim, or 150,000, as the Greeks claim, whether it is a 
training command, as Ankara insists, or an amphibious assault 
force, as Athens says, these are forces deployed in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. They are certainly not needed to defend 
Turkey from a possible military thrust from the Greek islands, which 
would be suicidal from the Greeks to contemplate.64 
5. Continental Shelf 
The issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf, which Greece 
recognizes as the only legal difference between the two countries, is generated  
 
 
                                            
62 Clive Schofield and Peter Hocknell, “Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean- A Cypriot 
Crisis in the Making,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 1998: 8. 
63 Martin and Schofield, The Imia Dispute in the Aegean Sea. 
64 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies, U.S Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus 
(New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 98. 
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by Turkey’s attempt to acquire continental shelf rights to the west of the Greek 
islands of the Aegean, an act that would essentially ensnare them in an area 
under Turkish jurisdiction. 
The dispute over continental shelf rights emerged in 1973, when the 
Turkish Government Gazette published a decision to grant the Turkish national 
petroleum company permits to conduct research in underwater areas close to the 
Greek islands. Repeating the same practice after the invasion in Cyprus, the 
Turkish Government extended the areas already under license in 1974.  The 
same year, the Turkish survey ship Candarli, accompanied by no less than thirty 
two warships, spent six days cruising along the western limits of the Turkish 
claim; a further voyage was made by the Hora in 1976, which conducted 
oceanographic research on the Greek continental shelf west of Lesbos for three 
days.   
Turkey’s refusal to solve the issue in the International Court, led the 
deadlock unaltered until March 1987 when the Turkish vessel Sismik-1, escorted 
again by Turkish warships, set out for the Aegean to conduct underwater 
research just off the coastal zone of the Greek islands, bringing the crisis to the 
verge of armed conflict. The crisis, which was defused after the rapid mobilization 
of the Greek Navy and an exchange of messages between the two Prime 
Ministers, also provided Greece with the opportunity to reiterate her constant 
stance on delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf; a stance that remains 
unaltered to this day.65 
C. FYROM AND THE “MACEDONIAN QUESTION” 
The traditional “Macedonian Question”—spanning from the last decades 
of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century—was mainly a contest 
over territories, and as such, an issue of regional and international security. 
During the latter part of the twentieth century and up to this day, it has evolved 
                                            
65 Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Continental Shelf,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Greece 
in the World, 2011, http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-
Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Differences/Continental+Shelf/ (accessed March 12, 2011). 
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chiefly as an issue of identities, systematically categorized by Dr. Evangelos 
Kofos into three distinct groups: identity of the land, identities of the people 
connected to the land, and identity of heritage. According to Kofos, the core of 
the controversy lies within the first group, because “[t]he names ‘Macedonia’ and 
‘Macedonians’ are claims for title deeds66 to the Macedonian land, its peoples 
and their historical/cultural heritage.”67 
Indeed, the idea of a unified Macedonia closely associated with irredentist 
claims against Greek territory, traces back to WWII, when Josip Broz Tito 
separated the area then known as Vardar Banovina (now the FYROM) from 
Serbia, and granted it the status of a republic within the new Yugoslav federation, 
under the name Socialist Republic of Macedonia.68 In tandem with promoting the 
“Macedonianism” doctrine, a concept that supported the existence of a separate 
“Macedonian” nation, Tito cultivated the notion of reunification of all Macedonian 
territories, ultimately aiming at Yugoslav access to the Aegean Sea. Greek fears 
were kept alive during the Cold War by Skopje’s complaints regarding the 
treatment of a “Macedonian minority” in northern Greece. Athens choice to 
downplay the issue, mainly out of desire to maintain good relations with 
Yugoslavia, kept the diplomatic pace low, but did not hinder the emergence of an 
otherwise unsubstantiated “Macedonian question.”69 
                                            
66 The legal term “title deed” refers to a deed or document evidencing a person’s legal right 
or title to property, especially to real property. 
67 Kofos, Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, 3.  
68  Stephen Larrabee, “Greek Security Concerns in the Balkans,” in Greece and the New 
Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities, vol. VI in Modern Greek Research Series, ed. Van 
Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (New York: Pella Publishing Company 
Inc., 1999), 317. For a detailed discussion on the Macedonian issue see the comprehensive work 
of Evangelos Kofos in Evangelos Kofos, “National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Century Macedonia,” in Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, ed. Martin 
Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (Athens, Attiki: ELIAMEP, 1990). 
69 Geographically, the term Macedonia refers to a broader region that includes portions of 
the territories of various Balkan countries (mainly Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Bulgaria). However, the greater part of geographical Macedonia coincides with 
the area covered by the ancient Greek Macedonia, which lies within the boundaries of modern 
Greece (55% in Greece, 35% in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 9% in Bulgaria and 
1% in Albania). Currently, approximately 2.5 million Greek citizens live in the Greek part of 
Macedonia, whose inhabitants have called and considered themselves Macedonians since time 
immemorial. 
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In its contemporary dimensions, the “Macedonian question” arose in 1991, 
when, following the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia declared its independence under the name “Republic of 
Macedonia”, dragging Athens in a dispute over the official name of the newly 
independent state. More alarming to the Greeks is the fact that FYROM refers to 
Greek Macedonia as the “Egejski del na Makedonija pod Grcja” (the Aegean part 
of Macedonia under Greece.)70 As both the formal area of the Republic and the 
wider geographical/ethnic map transcending three states (Greece, Bulgaria and 
FYROM) are identified by FYROM as Macedonia, the inference is clear that the 
two parts in Greece and Bulgaria are “unjustly” under foreign rule.  
Recent initiatives in FYROM have certainly embroiled the “name issue” 
with elements striking sensitive chords of the Greek people. By nurturing the 
notion that the country’s citizens are the descendents of the ancient 
Macedonians via schoolbooks and propaganda, FYROM’s political leadership 
cultivates the concept of a United Macedonia, opening the way to claims on 
“occupied” territories. The latest examples of this conduct include the renaming 
of the airport of Skopje to Alexander the Great and the European corridor X to 
Alexander the Macedonian, and the launch of the “Macedonian Encyclopedia” full 
of inaccuracies of the region’s history, as well as the revelations of a statue of 
Alexander the Great, placed at Skopje’ s central square. 
For Greek security thinking, apart from history and historical heritage, the 
issue at stake is the emergence of revisionist claims.71 Given additional 
expression in a constitution that affirmed the existence of a Macedonian people, 
allegedly inhabiting the wider Macedonian area and envisaging its eventual 
unification, these claims intensified Greek fears of FYROM’s revisionism. That 
such fears were not unfounded was proved by Skopje’s decision to include in its 
                                            
70 Emphasis mine; a similar treatment is reserved for the Bulgarian part, which is identified 
as “Pirinska del na Makedonija pod Balgarija” (The Pirin part of Macedonia under Bulgaria); 
Evangelos Kofos, National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
Macedonia, 4. 
71 Dokos, Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 250.  
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national flag the emblem of the Macedonian dynasty, the star of Vergina. The 
adoption of such a symbol as the state’s flag was yet another gesture with 
devastating impact on Greek public opinion. Since the symbol had not been 
widely known before Manolis Andronikos excavated Philip’s tomb in Vergina (a 
small town southeast of Thessaloniki) in 1978, FYROM’s President Gligorov 
could not claim that this had been a symbol that stirred patriotic feelings among 
his people. Baiting the Greeks turned out to be a highly effective political exercise 
addressed to his parliament’s nationalist gallery.72 
Nevertheless, outside Greece, the reasons for Greek passion were poorly 
understood and, worse, poorly explained by Athens. An eloquent interpretation of 
Greek vehemence on the issue of the new republic’s name is provided by 
Monteagle Stearns:  
Those in the United States in particular, who have criticized Greece 
for being swept away by nationalism, might reflect on how 
American public opinion would react if the northeastern states of 
Mexico declared their independence under the name ‘the Republic 
of Texas’ and raised a flag emblazoned the Alamo.73  
While militarily the threat to the Greek security posed by Skopje is 
negligible, the sensitivities of the Greek people, and especially of the inhabitants 
of Greek Macedonia, to any challenge to their identity are acute.74 The 
magnitude of this threat is further implicated by the Turkish factor. As Yannis 
Valinakis observes, Turkey’s quick recognition of FYROM in February 1992 
                                            
72 The constitution of FYROM contains a preamble that refers to the founding document of 
the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) of August 1944, 
which reads as follows: “Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece… the unification of the entire 
Macedonia people depends on our participation in the gigantic Anti-Fascist front.” As Thanos 
Veremis notes: “The irredentist heritage of state born under a communist star was paradoxically 
enshrined in the constitution of a democratic entity that appealed for recognition”; in Thanos 
Veremis, “Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era,” vol. VII, in Greece and the New 
Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre 
Gerolymatos (New York: Pella Publishing Company Inc., 1999), 35–37. 
73 Stearns, Greek Security Issues, 65. A good discussion on the internal dynamics in 
FYROM and their linkage to broader aspects of stability in the Balkans is provided in:  Sofia 
Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia 
(Paris: Western European Institute of Security Studies, 1997). 
74 Larrabee, Greece & the Balkans: Implications for Policy, 34. 
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rekindled Greek fears of Turkish encirclement.75 Stephen Larrabee’s 1997 
counter-argument that such fears “appear[ed] highly exaggerated” is considered 
obsolete after the recent publication of Ahmet Davutoglu’s book, The Strategic 
Depth, which introduces the notion of neo-Ottomanism.76 According to the Neo-
Ottoman dogma, Ankara should pursue a more active policy in the Balkans, 
exploiting the religious factor as the vehicle for Turkish intervention, in and 
among the Muslim ethnic groups of the Balkans: FYROM, Kosovo, Albania, 
Bosnia. Thus, in an otherwise remarkable exhibition of geopolitical and 
geostrategic vision, the Turkish Foreign Minister stokes Greece’s—Orthodox—
insecurities of a Muslim encirclement.  
D. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION 
Another crucial effect of the dissolution of Yugoslavia for the security 
concerns of Greece was the fact that it rekindled the Albanian question, a 
traditional “national question,” centered on redrawing territorial borders to form a 
new ethnic nation-state, encompassing all the Albanian communities in the 
Balkans. The central theme of the Albanian question is the notion of “Greater 
Albania” or “Great Albania.” This term refers to an irredentist concept of lands 
outside the borders of Albania, which, based on the present-day or historical 
presence of Albanian populations in those areas, are considered part of a greater 
national homeland by some Albanians. Although the contemporary core of the 
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77 Judy Batt, “Introduction,” in Chaillot Paper No. 107-Is there an Albanian Question?, ed. 
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as part of this agenda seeks political control over part of Epirus—the 
northwestern region of Greece—claiming it to comprise an organic part of the 
Great Albania.78 
 
Figure 3.   Albanian Map Depicting the Borders of “Great Albania.”79  
In addition to irredentist claims, Tirana’s reluctance to grant the large 
Greek minority on the Albanian side the internationally recognized rights of ethnic 
minorities—at least not in full measures—is perceived as an attempt to de-
                                            
78 According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010 report, the idea of a Greater Albania is 
supported by the majority of Albanians in Albania (63 percent), Kosovo (81 percent), and FYROM 
(53 percent). See: Besar Likmeta, Balkan Insight, Nov 17, 2010, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/survey-greater-albania-remains-popular (accessed 3 
December 2010). 
79  Who Was Alexander the Great? Albanian Times. Accessed March 18, 2011. 
http://www.albaniantimes.com/2010/01/who-was-alexander-great.html. 
 28
Hellenize the southern part of Albania.80 Greek concerns were intensified after 
Albanian maneuvers regarding the recent Albanian national inventory: initially 
programmed to take place in April 2011, Albanian authorities postponed it for 
November, officially claiming that the local elections of May would conflict with 
the inventory procedure. As Albanian nationalist circles yearn for the removal of 
questions regarding ethnicity from the questionnaire,81 Athens views the 
postponement as a reaction to the Greek minority’s demand of freely declaring 
their ethnicity and religious views, in accordance with international and european 
legislation. As the spokesman of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, 
this postponement, in tandem with Albanian extreme nationalistic exultations, 
creates grounded suspicion of questionnaire alteration.  
Greek skepticism is further fused through specific events that, although 
isolated, have significant political symbolism: apart from the controversial local 
election in October 2000, when Greek minority leaders reported widespread 
ballot-rigging and violence against ethnic Greek voters, particularly in the district 
of Himara,82 the recent murder by Albanian nationalists of an inhabitant of 
Himara, because he was speaking in Greek,83 reaffirmed Greece’s concerns 
regarding the respect for human rights of the Greek minority in Albania. Far more 
upsetting was the reaction of Tirana. Although the Prime Minister of Albania 
condemned the event, speaking of “an action of blind fanaticism,” a large portion 
                                            
80 The most fundamental of these rights include native-language schools and religious 
freedom; the latter involving the recognition and unhindered functioning of the Orthodox Church, 
to which the Greek Minority belongs. For a well-researched documentary account of the history of 
Albania’s Greek minority, see The Greek Minority in Albania, A Documentary Record (1921–
1993), Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1994. 
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Greek and the rest are bilingual. For more, see “Albania: State of the Nation,” ICG Balkans 
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83 Stauros Tzimas, “Kathimerini.gr,” (August 17, 2010), accessed December 3, 2010, 
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of the press downplayed it, rekindling suspicions in Athens that the notion of 
Great Albania essentially never faded away. 
Even so, for Greece the potential of an Albanian offensive against it is, as 
in the case of FYROM, connected to Turkey’s actions in the Balkans. In this 
context, Turkey’s recent action to undertake the cost and construction of an 
Albanian naval base resonates in Greek security circles not only as another 
indication of Ankara’s attempt to establish a Turkish-dominated Muslim Arc in the 
Balkans, but also as a potential military lever against Greece. 
E. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
Situated in the southeast part of the Mediterranean Sea, Greece’s 
geographical position assigns it the role of EU’s gatekeeper. Whereas, until the 
late ‘80s, Greece was a largely homogeneous country,84 after the fall of 
communist regimes, a mass influx of illegal immigrants took residence in Greece, 
mostly from the neighboring countries of the north. In the last decade, the wave 
of illegal immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa has increased 
considerably, comprising approximately half of the annual inflow to Greece—the 
other half originating mainly from Albania. Monitoring the illegal border crossing 
in the EU, Frontex, the EU’s agency for external border security, provides striking 
comparative data: in its risk assessment of 2010, Frontex concludes that all 
Greek external borders of the EU—including land (with Albania, FYROM and 
Turkey), air and sea borders—account for 90 percent of all illegal border crossing 
along the EU external borders.85 
                                            
84 The population consisted mostly of Greek Orthodox (98%), with a minority of Greek 
Muslims situated mostly in the northern area of Thrace, and some smaller communities of 
Catholics and Jews. 
85 Frontex, “Frontex Press Kit-Current Migratory Situation in Greece,” (2010), accessed 
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These increases did not occur fortuitously; increased maritime patrols and 
bilateral deals to deport illegals, such as Italy’s with Libya and Spain’s with 
Senegal and Mauritania, have largely closed down the western and central 
Mediterranean routes into the EU, essentially stemming the illegal immigration 
flow to the east.86 As a consequence, the main irregular migration route from 
Asia to Europe, goes into Greece through Turkey, crossing either the narrow 
straits that divide mainland Turkey from several of the Greek islands of the 
Aegean (e.g., Mytilini or Chios) or—mainly—the Evros River on the northeastern 
part of the border in Thrace, on small boats.87  
Greek attempts to negotiate an agreement with Turkey have stalled. 
Although the two countries have signed a bilateral agreement concerning 
organized crime and illegal immigration (December 17, 2005), Turkey does not 
conform to its obligations under the convention, such as re-acceptance of 
expelled people from Greece that have previously left the Turkish coastline.88 
Skepticism in Athens regarding Turkish motivation behind this non-cooperative 
stance has been underscored by video footage confirming that the Turkish Coast 
Guard deposits immigrants in the Greek islands. The latest major incident took 
place on August 19, 2008, in the vicinity of the island of Lesvos, one of the 
easternmost Greek islands and has raised serious questions on Ankara’s role in 
the huge illegal immigration problem the Greek authorities are facing.89  
                                            
86 Ibid. 
87 Anna Triantafyllidou, Michaela Maroufof and Marina Nikolova, Immigration Towards 
Greece at the Eve of the 21st Century–A Critical Assessment., Working Paper No 4, ELIAMEP 
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88 As Frontex Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias-Fernandez asserts:  “The main problem 
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89 A Greek Coast Guard vessel on patrol originally spotted the Turkish boat in the vicinity of 
Cape Korakas, well inside Greek waters, carrying an unknown number of illegal immigrants. 
Footage published by the Greek newspaper To Ethnos shows a man on board the Turkish vessel 
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The continuing waves of illegal immigrants has compelled the Greek 
government to commence a costly program for the construction of new 
acceptance facilities in the eastern borders of the country, as the already existing 
infrastructure has proven inadequate. Recent Greek thoughts of building a fence 
along part of its borders with Turkey, to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing, 
have been dealt with skepticism from EU officials, who view it as short-term 
measures, which will not allow tackling illegal immigration in a structural 
manner.90 After an official Greek request, the EU’s border protection agency 
Frontex sent a two hundred-member force to the Greek-Turkish border areas to 
provide Athens with emergency assistance in patrolling one of the main points of 
entry for illegal immigrants into the EU. 
Despite its professionalism, Frontex’s practical results are washed away 
by the existing EU legal framework governing undocumented immigrants.  Once 
these individuals enter the EU borders, their future is regulated by what is known 
as the Dublin II procedure, a European Council (EC) regulation, which 
establishes that undocumented immigrants found anywhere in the EU must be 
returned to their country of entry.91 Under these provisions, if immigrants who 
pass through Greece apply for asylum in any EU member-state, their fingerprints 
show up on what's called the “Eurodoc system,” and they are sent back to 
Greece. As the majority of undocumented immigrants in the EU enter European 
soil through Greece, Dublin II essentially targets Greece, generating a feeling 
among officials in Athens that faraway Brussels requires them to be gatekeepers 
for the whole of the EU, without the organization having to deal with the Greek 
security tensions. This feeling of resentment was confirmed after the Tunisian 
                                            
90 Michele Cercone, spokesman for the EU Commission in: BBC, “News- Europe,” BBC, 
Janurary 4, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12109595 (accessed March 18, 
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revolution of December 2010, which temporarily shifted the main immigration 
flow to the Italian island of Lampedusa. Responding to Italian threats to “grant 
temporary permits” to Tunisian migrants willing to join family in other EU 
countries—in essence violating the Dublin II regulation for the sake of its own 
internal security—the European Commissioner responsible for Home Affairs, 
Cecilia Malmström, rapidly mobilized EU funds and published a statement 
asserting that immigration is a matter of great importance for the EU as a whole, 
not just for Italy.92 Nevertheless, despite pompous statements of EU solidarity, 
Greece continues to carry the weight of Dublin II, and, along with it, the main 
volume of illegal immigrants entering EU territory. 
 
                                            
92 The European Refugee Fund, as its official name is, was to be directed toward 
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III. ATHENS’ QUEST FOR SECURITY PROVIDERS:  
THE ROAD TO CSDP 
A historical profile of the Greek political scene reveals a certain mentality 
regarding the role of foreign powers and institutions. Maneuvering in a state that 
was for years the object of blatant foreign intervention and, at the same time, 
foreign protection, a sizeable part of the Greek elite appears inclined to see the 
outside world in the role of either the “interventionist” or the “protector power.”93 
In the post-World War II years, Greece approached both protector powers 
available in the collective security market of the West, namely NATO and, later, 
the WEU. Despite being an active member of both, Athens also enthusiastically 
supported the concept of an autonomous European Defense Project since its 
launch in 1999.94 This choice raises several questions regarding Athens’ 
perceptions of its security guarantors: Was this preference a mere indication of 
European solidarity? Or does it reveal a deeper skepticism of—if not 
disappointment in—the current security-providing schemes? In order to answer 
these questions, this chapter proposes to assess the role of NATO and the WEU 
in Greece, and how this partnership developed during and after the Cold War. 
Placing the analysis in its historical context, this chapter also demonstrates that 
Greece’s attitude toward its security guarantors has been determined by its 
problems with Turkey. By doing so, this chapter provides the basic framework for 
comprehending Greece’s support and expectations for the CSDP. 
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A. 1947–1974: CYPRUS, THE COLONELS, AND NATO’S ECLIPSE 
Being a member of NATO since April 18, 1958, one would expect that 
Greece would have been able to concentrate on internal reconstruction after the 
civil war of 1946–1949. However, other security factors came to dominate its 
foreign and domestic policy: at a time when other NATO members orientated 
their security policy toward collective defense, Greece shifted its attention to 
divisive regional issues, which both implicated and imperiled the Greek 
relationship with NATO. The first signs emerged as early as 1955, when, Cypriot 
efforts to unify the island with Greece sparked anti-Greek riots in Turkey and 
caused Greece to withdraw from NATO exercises for the first time. The issue of 
enosis, or union, between Greece and Cyprus, held a prominent position in the 
post–war Greek political agenda, as it lay in the intersection of strategic interests 
and the demands of public opinion and national aspirations. The issue had 
festered at least since the UN General Assembly in 1954, where Athens first 
raised the issue of self-determination and union (enosis) of Cyprus to Greece. 
Britain, which was still in control of the island, introduced Turkey into the matter, 
to provide a counterweight to Greek demands and maintain its presence on the 
island. As the Turkish government assumed responsibility for the welfare of the 
Turkish Cypriots and eventually tried to promote and safeguard Turkish-Cypriot 
affairs, an anti-colonial struggle gradually developed into a confrontation between 
Greece and Turkey.95 
This confrontation further solidified after the NATO-imposed compromise 
solution of bifurcated Cypriot independence in 1960, where instead of enosis, a 
fundamentally unworkable constitution was proposed. Under the auspices of the 
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Zürich and London Agreement, which drafted the constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Cypriot people were divided into two communities on the basis of ethnic 
origin. The president had to be a Greek-Cypriot elected by the dominant Greek-
Cypriot community (more than 80 percent), and the vice-president a Turkish-
Cypriot elected by the Turkish-Cypriots. An additional Treaty of Guarantee, also 
agreed upon in Zürich, constituted the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece as 
the guarantor powers of the Republic of Cyprus, whereby all parties promised to 
prohibit the promotion of “either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any 
other State, or the partition of the Island.”  
After fighting broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities in 
Cyprus in late December 1963—over the disputed plans for constitutional 
revision proposed by the island’s president, Archbishop Makarios—Turkey 
threatened invasion in a number of instances. NATO preserved its neutral 
stance; it was U.S. President Lyndon Johnson who warned Turkish president 
Ismet İnönü in June 1964 of dire consequences should Turkey choose to invade 
the island.  When, in November 1967, intercommunal fighting reoccurred, it was 
again American diplomatic pressure that averted battle between the two NATO 
allies while the alliance itself remained aloof from the conflict or its resolution. 
Earlier that year in Greece, on April 21, 1967, military conspirators 
implemented a NATO contingency plan, designed in the event of serious internal 
disorders, and took over political power imposing a harsh dictatorship.96 Although 
public opinion and some governments in Western Europe regularly criticized the 
Greek junta, the military dictatorship never experienced serious pressure from 
NATO or the United States. The “Colonels” carefully fulfilled Greece’s obligations 
under the NATO alliance and appeared to serve American interests during a 
                                            
96 Papacosma, NATO, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era, 49. The NATO 
contingency plan did not specifically call for a dictatorship as such a move would violate the 
Alliance’s first principle for accepting a state as a member, namely established democracy. 
However, as the primary objective for the Alliance was securing its southeastern flank from the 
communist threat, the Greek junta could be tolerated on the basis of its anticommunist politics. 
Fotios Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003). 
 36
period of constant turmoil in the Middle East and of an augmented Soviet 
presence in the Mediterranean.  To the Greek public, particularly those citizens 
who felt the brunt of the junta’s domestic repression, NATO’s acceptance of the 
junta made the alliance part of the problem. 
Born of the struggle in and about Cyprus, the junta also faltered over the 
island.  The Greek dictatorship crumbled at the height of national crisis in the 
immediate aftermath of its 15 July 1974 attempt to replace Archbishop Makarios 
with a coup carried out by the pro-enosis Greek-Cypriot politician Nikos 
Sampson. Isolated at home and abroad, their support of the destabilization of the 
Cypriot government weakened President Makarios’s bargaining position even 
further, vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriot. As a Turkish diplomat stressed: 
The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing 
Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and 
for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States leverage on us in 
1974 was minimal. We should no longer be scared off by threats of 
the Soviet bogeyman.97 
Aware of the weak bargaining position of the Greek dictators, Turkey 
exploited the opportunity to execute policy it was denied during the 1960s and 
invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974. Unable to handle the crisis, the dictatorship 
collapsed and democracy was restored under the conservative government of 
Konstantinos Karamanlis. The latter’s attempts to resolve the crisis at the 
Geneva peace talks collapsed when Turkey launched a broad offensive on 14 
August 1974. More than a third of the island fell under Turkish control, 
concurrently creating about 180,000 Greek-Cypriots refugees who fled to the 
south. 
Inflamed by NATO’s indifference to Turkey’s actions on Cyprus and by 
charges that NATO acted to limit Greece’s response to Turkish invasion, merely 
four hours after Turkey launched its offensive, Karamanlis announced the 
withdrawal of Greece’s armed forces from the NATO military command. The 
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prime minister later divulged that only two choices lay before him: to declare war 
against Turkey or to limit links with NATO. The former was not feasible due to the 
fact that the army was ill-prepared to confront a Turkish attack. Karamanlis chose 
the lesser of the two evils. Athens now needed full control over Greece’s armed 
forces during a time of threatening war.98  
Greek thinking, up to today, holds that NATO bore much of the 
responsibility for the invasion of Cyprus and, indeed, for the whole dispute. As 
the Greeks see the matter, NATO allowed one of its members, using NATO 
weapons, to take thirty-five thousand of its forces out of the NATO structure in 
order to occupy part of another democratic European country. On top of this, 
Turkey effectively colonized another member of the western community; it was 
the first time in post-war European history that colonization, invasion, and 
occupation of a western European country by another had occurred. Turkey’s 
aggressive attitude resulted in the occupation of thirty-seven percent of Cyprus, 
fifty-two percent of the island’s coastline, seventy percent of its natural resources 
and sixty-five percent of its tourist infrastructure, not to mention the fact that all of 
the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus fled to the south.99  
To Greek eyes, although the Alliance had both the means and the 
opportunity to act positively and avoid tragedy, by its neutrality it allowed Turkey 
to aggressively advance its interests on the troubled island. This stance, which 
has left is footprint on Greek political life up to the present day, not only severely 
damaged Greek perceptions of NATO’s willingness to address its interests, but 
also furnished the occasion for Turkey to challenge long-standing practices and 
internationally recognized Greek sovereign rights on still another front: the 
Aegean Sea. 
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B. 1974–1990: MAKING PEACE WITH NATO  
With its strategic position enhanced after the military occupation of the 
northern part of Cyprus, and taking advantage of Greece’s withdrawal from the 
NATO military command, Turkey found the opportunity to contest Greece’s 
mineral exploitation rights in the Aegean continental shelf and dispute Athens’ 
control of the Aegean FIR and long-established policy of a ten-mile territorial air-
space for its Aegean islands. Sensing that Turkey could better advance its claims 
in the Aegean with Greece out of the military command, the Greek government 
announced, in October 1975, that it would consider returning its armed forces to 
the NATO fold. Ankara responded by raising the issue of operational control of 
the Aegean, creating one contentious dimension of the Aegean disputes between 
the two states.  
With both states vetoing NATO-mediated proposals for a solution to 
Greece’s reintegration, it was not until the aftermath of the Turkish military’s coup 
d’état on September 12, 1976 that progress was made. In light of momentous 
domestic problems and after intensive efforts by NATO’s supreme allied 
commander, General Bernard Rogers, the Turkish military declared that it would 
consider Greece’s re-entry, under the condition that, following the establishment 
of a Greek-NATO headquarters in Larissa, there would be cooperation with the 
Turkish command in Smyrna for air defense and radar coverage of the Aegean 
Sea. Although the two states agreed to begin negotiations to delimit the 
command and control boundaries, years of deadlock ensued: Athens called for a 
resumption of the 1974 operations status quo ante (before the establishment of 
the Greek-NATO headquarters in Larissa), while Ankara responded that it could 
not consider restoration of the earlier conditions. As expected, Turkey was not 
willing to give up the unexpected gift of operational say it was granted in the 
Aegean by Greece’s withdrawal form NATO. 
The electoral victory of the socialist Andreas Papandreou in October 1981 
enhanced the skeptical stance of Greek society vis-à-vis NATO. The new prime 
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minister, who had persistently harped on the negative roles and influence of both 
in Greek affairs, pressed Greece’s positions more shrilly than his predecessors, 
declaring that Greece’s relations with NATO passed through Ankara. Repeatedly 
stating to the Alliance that the danger to Greece’s security came from Turkey to 
the east, and not from the Soviet Bloc to the north, Papandreou stressed that 
NATO should extend a security guarantee for Greece’s frontiers against potential 
Turkish aggression. Alliance partners denied this request for the first time (as 
they would again in later years) in December 1981, at the meeting of Defense 
Ministers, intensifying Greek grievances over airspace and operational command 
problems in the Aegean. Disappointed by NATO’s indifference, Athens adjusted 
its national security doctrine accordingly. In January 1985, the Greek Ministry of 
Defense announced its new defense doctrine, which, officially declaring that 
Greece’s primary threat came from the east, confirmed what had been an actual 
policy since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.  
Despite his political rhetoric and posturing while in opposition, 
Papandreou’s tenure brought no major shifts in Greece’s broader relations with 
NATO. Aware that a falling-out with the Alliance would only improve Turkey’s 
diplomatic influence and military posturing in Cyprus and the Aegean, 
Papandreou, now Prime Minister, returned Greek armed forces to the NATO fold 
in 1981. Nonetheless, Athens continued to express its grievances over Brussels’ 
inattention to Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus and to the challenges Turkey posed 
to Greek sovereignty on several Aegean fronts. The post-1974 period rendered it 
obvious that Greek and NATO defense doctrines did not simply diverge, but, 
essentially, they were antithetical.100 Trying to avoid resonances of the Greek-
Turkish tension on the alliance’s operations and planning, NATO avoided 
addressing the issue directly and disparaged its importance. As a result of this 
neglect, Greek confidence in the Alliance’s actual efficiency to address the 
bilateral conflict was severely damaged. Seeking to deal with the discrepancy 
between its inability to deal alone with the Turkish threat and NATO’s indifference 
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to support its interests, Greece initiated a process of examining other security 
alternatives, a process that in the mid-1990s culminated in its membership in the 
WEU. 
C. 1990–PRESENT: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
The cataclysmic event of the nineties, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, 
was less disorientating for Greek security thinking than for NATO. Unlike their 
counterparts in Brussels, Greek defense planning did not require doctrine 
adjustment, order of battle reformulation, or new missions to carry out its 
purpose; in Greek eyes, when NATO reluctantly announced the end of the Cold 
War, the main threat to Greece’s security remained where it had always been, in 
the east.101 It was the collapse of Yugoslavia, not of the Soviet Union, that 
disorientated Greece, and upset the regional balance at the expense of Greek 
security.  
 The most alarming effect of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation 
was the emergence of an independent “Macedonian” state with potential 
territorial aspirations against Greece. Some recent analyses conclude that Greek 
policy responses to the perceived threat emanating from Skopje were 
exaggerated; however, it is a common knowledge that Athens had legitimate 
concerns, as even the literature that finds the Greeks to be overreacting at least 
acknowledges a threat in Macedonian irredentism.102 As discussed in Chapter II, 
the idea of a unified Macedonia had historically been closely associated with 
irredentist claims against Greek (and Bulgarian) territories. The challenge, for 
Greece, thus arose when the old Yugoslav federal entity turned suddenly into an 
aspiring independent state without shedding its irredentist claims. When the old 
federal entity appealed to the international community for recognition under the 
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name the “Republic of Macedonia,” without a prefix that would differentiate it from 
the Macedonian region in Greece, Athens was caught unprepared. The Greek 
public was abruptly alerted to the fact that the recognition of the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia as an independent entity could legitimize its irredentist 
claims as well.103 
A second security problem that the dissolution of Yugoslavia triggered was 
the Albanian question. The main concern for Athens was Kosovo: Potential 
unrest in the Albanian-speaking part of Serbia could spill over into the large 
Albanian minority of FYROM, leading to secessionist tendencies, with dramatic 
consequences for Greece. At the same time, the collapse of communism led to 
the reemergence of long suppressed nationalist feelings in Albania, which the 
government of Sali Berisha skillfully manipulated for its own purposes. 
Manifesting themselves in particular over the treatment of the Greek minority in 
southern Albania, and combined with increased problems posed by the flood of—
economic—Albanian refugees into Greece, these nationalist differences led to a 
sharp deterioration in Greek Albanian relations. 
On top of these issues, Turkey’s new activism in the Balkans stirred fears 
in Athens that Ankara was trying to create an “Islamic Arc” on Greece’s northern 
border, encircling and isolating Greece. In Greek eyes, Turkey’s conclusion of 
major agreements with Sofia, Skopje and Tirana, as well as its recognition of 
FYROM in February 1992, were perceived as part of a calculated effort by 
Ankara to create a “Turkish network” of clients throughout the Balkans at 
Greece’s expense. In particular, with an eye on Greece’s Muslim population in 
Thrace, Greek politicians worried that the calls for greater autonomy and 
separatism elsewhere in the Balkans could encourage Turkey to play the “Islamic 
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card” in Greece’s northeast region.104 Regardless of whether such fears were 
exaggerated, it is a fact that Athens consistently accorded higher priority to its 
eastern defenses that to its northern borders. Even the cataclysmic event of 
Yugoslavia’s breakup was not evaluated in strict regional terms, but in the 
context of Greece’s troubled relationship with Ankara.  
With NATO failing to address Greek concerns, even those rising from the 
Yugoslav disintegration, Athens considered the option of WEU in 1995, only to 
receive an analogous disappointment. The Greek disillusionment that WEU could 
cover Greece’s insecurities is stressed by David Yost, who, explaining the 
reasoning behind the very existence of the WEU, noted: “the WEU served 
primarily as a mechanism to reassure West Germany’s neighbors and Alliance 
partners that Bonn’s military capabilities would respect agreed constraints”.105 
Although Yost refers to the Cold War functions of the WEU, his observation 
highlights the organization’s limitations in addressing Greece’s major security 
concern. The breadth of these limitations would be signaled even prior to 
Greece’s accession, when a declaration of the heads of state and government of 
the WEU, issued in June 1992 at St. Petersberg, imposed restrictions on the 
security warranties, in case a member-state’s rival was a NATO member.106 The 
additional protocol that WEU members attached to the article of Greek accession 
made clear that the Brussels Treaty’s mutual defense commitment would not 
apply in the case of a conflict between Greece and a fellow NATO member (i.e., 
Turkey). 
Less than a year after Greece’s accession, this protocol would be put to 
the test when, in 1996, Turkey contested Greece’s sovereignty over the rocky 
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islets of Imia. Once again, it was a case of American intervention rather than that 
of NATO or European allies that averted a military confrontation. The Imia crisis 
not only demonstrated the minimal role that NATO could play in crisis 
management, but also highlighted the inability of the WEU to act as a mediator in 
a crisis or as a guarantor of borders.107 Disappointed by its allies’ lack of 
solidarity in the face of Turkey’s aggressive acts, Greece called again for the 
inclusion of a “clause of solidarity and guarantee of external borders” at the EU’s 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam, yet the request was again 
rejected by the WEU. 
Ironically, the WEU’s failure to become the EU’s military arm was for 
Greece a most promising sign, because this failure shifted the EU toward the 
development of a—hopefully—fully autonomous European Defense Arm. In this 
context, the CSDP represents one of the more recent entries in a list of highly 
expected solutions. The following chapter will address the evolution of the CSDP 
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IV. THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVE: THE CSDP 
The European integration process did not lack for security aspirations 
during its early years in the 1940s and 1950s,108 but these were rapidly 
overtaken by the onset of the Cold War and the subsequent organization of the 
U.S.-dominated NATO—the only viable body through which to meet those 
challenges.109 The end of the Cold War, however, sparked a new debate on the 
future of European security, raising concerns about whether Western European 
states, lacking the (common) threat from the outside, would fall back into security 
competition. Undergoing a change towards further integration, the European 
security architecture decided to supplement (though not replace) its existing 
transatlantic framework of security cooperation, NATO, with a new institutional 
construct embedded into the European Union: The European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP).110 
A. THE EARLY YEARS 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the destabilization 
arising from the Balkan Wars that followed, altered the security balance and 
heightened the stakes for European security. On the one hand, the United States 
manifestly did not wish to be involved in Balkan security; on the other hand, the 
EU lacked the competence to intervene with any real effect. With regional 
security requiring urgent attention, two solutions emerged: The first was to give 
greater institutional and political influence to the WEU, a body whose sole raison 
d’être in the first place was to coordinate its member-states in the fields of 
security and defense. In an effort to cope with the potential destabilizing of 
Eastern Europe, WEU adopted in 1992, alongside its Article V (common 
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defense) role, a set of humanitarian, peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks.111 
However, the “Petersberg tasks,” as this set was later called, remained a promise 
on paper: dependent on cooperation between its members and lacking a 
standing army, WEU was never involved in the Balkan security and an alternative 
had to be examined. The second solution was to permit European forces to 
utilize, under special procedures, military assets and infrastructure from NATO. 
The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as this solution was later 
named, aimed at passing over WEU’s structural deficiencies by creating a 
European “pillar” within NATO, partly to allow European countries to act militarily 
where NATO wished not to, and partly to alleviate the United States' financial 
burden of maintaining military bases in Europe, which it had done since the Cold 
War.  
Both solutions proved unsatisfactory: the former (WEU) not only lacked 
political clout, political legitimacy and political credibility, but also staked its 
military capacity on borrowing assets from the United States, assets that were 
“either jealously guarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (especially after 9/11) or 
simply not available because they were urgently needed by the U.S. military 
itself.”112 The latter (ESDI) proved problematic both practically and institutionally, 
because not only it was dependent on WEU for political direction, but it also was 
predicated on a re-organization of NATO’s command chain that the United States 
was not prepared to accept; not to mention the absence, as in the case of the 
WEU, of a standing military force. The failure of both options to address the 
European security in a comprehensible manner, intensified European attempts to 
maximize their own security and defense capability. However, the realization of 
such a project was halted by one serious impediment: the respective positions of 
France and the UK regarding the likely impact in Washington of the advent of 
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serious European muscle. As long as the “Euro-Atlantic security dilemma”113 
divided Europe’s greater military powers, a robust European Security and 
Defense Policy could not flourish. 
B. SAINT-MALO AND THE FRANCO-BRITISH COMPROMISE: THE 
BIRTH OF ESDP 
The Euro-Atlantic security dilemma essentially reflected the differing 
perception that Paris and London maintained of the role of the United States in 
European security. On the one hand laid traditional British reluctance that if 
Europe demonstrated a genuine ability to take care of itself militarily, the USA 
would revert to isolationism; not to mention British doubts that Europeans on their 
own could not forge a credible military defense mechanism. On the other hand, 
Paris insisted that USA could not respect allies who would not take themselves 
seriously. It was not until 1998 in Saint-Malo that traditional British hesitation 
about a European defense plan changed into endorsement. The bilateral 
declaration issued by French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair spurred the formulation of a common European Security and 
Defense Policy: “[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”114 This 
declaration, which laid the political foundation between France and Great Britain 
in European security and defense, facilitated the launch of the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) and, along with it, the formulation of the Headline 
Goal, a timeline setting the goals for the newborn European Project. 
The change of British attitude is widely attributed to two factors. The first, 
was the rising storm-cloud in Kosovo and the reappearance of military conflict in 
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the Balkans, which dominated the entire decade of the 1990s.115 The second, 
which essentially galvanized British security thinking, was a clear messages from 
Washington that a greater European defense capacity could lift part of the 
security weight from NATO’s—and essentially U.S.—shoulders. The “part of” 
element of this equation is critical in understanding the essence behind the Saint-
Malo declaration, and consequently the laying foundations and limits of its 
offspring, the ESDP. Despite French expectations, the actual issue at stake at 
Saint-Malo was not the emergence of a European defense presence per se, but 
the way to achieve it without upsetting the American role in European defense. In 
this context, the Saint-Malo declaration represents more of a Franco-British 
compromise than an actual agreement; concurring in NATO’s primacy for 
European defense, France accepted a limited role for the ESDP that would not 
duplicate NATO structures116 and Britain smoothed its traditional pro-atlanticist 
stance.  
The political will shown at Saint-Malo appeared to Greece as a promising 
choice. Based on the ambitious bilateral declaration, the potential of a—strictly—
European autonomous force projection capability could give the EU a role in 
defense and perhaps even cover the territorial security interests of Greece that 
NATO and WEU failed to address.  This possibility seemed especially promising 
as Athens’s territorial concerns derive mainly from Turkey, a state that is not a 
member of the EU, and therefore outside the EU decision-making process. 
Greek diplomacy could thus retain some hope of influencing—or at least 
prevailing upon—such an entity to account for its security interests, particularly 
those related to Greece’s non-EU neighbor.  
Nevertheless, Greek enthusiasm was short-lived. As the Franco-British 
declaration evoked American insecurities regarding whether an independent 
European Defense Project might result in a declining importance of NATO as a 
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transatlantic forum, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put forth 
her famous “three Ds,” outlining American expectations toward ESDP: (i) no 
duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, (ii) no decoupling from the 
United States and NATO, and (iii) no discrimination against non-EU NATO 
members. Essentially picturing Turkey, Albright’s last “D” reminded Athens that 
Ankara, although not an EU-member, would not be left outside the CSDP. The 
same obstacle that Greece had been encountering within NATO, namely the 
uneasy symbiosis with its primary security concern, was replicating itself in the 
infant CSDP: using the NATO backdoor, Turkey could have a say in a project 
that was initially envisioned to be comprised of EU members only. 
C. UNVEILING THE CSDP: THE HEADLINE GOALS AND THE CSDP 
STRUCTURE 
1. The Headline Goal 
Built on the Saint-Malo declaration, the Helsinki Headline Goal was the 
CSDP military capability timeline set by the European Council during its 
December 1999 meeting at Helsinki. Under this timeline, the EU pledged itself to 
be able to deploy sustain military forces capable of fulfilling the full range of 
Petersberg tasks, in operations up to corps level,117 to be capable of intervening 
in any crisis that could occur in an area where European interests are affected by 
the year 2003. The aim was to make those forces self-reliant, deployable within 
sixty days and over a radius of six thousand kilometers around Brussels, and 
sustainable in the field for a year.118 Despite speculations that the CSDP 
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architects at Helsinki were aiming at the creation of a “Euro-Army,”119 the 
strength and scope of the “Rapid Reaction Force” (ERRF), the official name of 
the Headline Goal force, indicate otherwise. Apart from its limited military 
strength, compared even to national armies—far more to NATO—ERRF was 
designed to be formed on a voluntary basis from assets of the participating 
members’ national armies. Each mission mounted by the CSDP would have a 
specific lifetime, and upon termination, its resources, both human and material, 
that were initially assigned to it, would revert to their national owners. The critical 
issue for Greece was not the ERRF’s standing or ad hoc nature, but the range of 
missions that it encompassed: by explicitly stating its intentions to restrict itself 
within the Petersberg crisis management tasks’ realm—and thus outside of any 
kind of territorial defense—Helsinki shattered Greek expectations of a European 
defense shield. Despite proclaiming a defense dimension in its very name, the 
CSDP orientation established in Helsinki was clearly rejecting the defense 
dimension Greece was hoping for.  
2. The CSDP Structure 
Along with the announcement of the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, 
the EU decided at Helsinki on the CSDP chain of command. The first—in 
hierarchy—body established at the Helsinki Summit was the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) or Comité Politique et Sécurité (COPS). Comprised of 
representatives of the political directors and a representative of the Commission, 
the PSC was designed to be a permanent, ambassador-level group. Its task 
would be to exercise under the authority of the Council, the political control and 
strategic direction of the operation and deal with all aspects of the CFSP, 
including the CSDP.120  
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The second body was the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the highest 
military body within the EU. The EUMC is composed of national military 
representatives to the EU, namely the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) in permanent 
session.121 Its primary function is to give military advice and make 
recommendations to the political bodies of the EU, first and foremost to the PSC 
and the Council. Its secondary function is to provide military direction to a third 
body, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), acting as the interface between the Member 
States and the Council in military matters. 
The EUMS is comprised of candidates nominated by the Member States 
under the command of the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), a three-
star general. Its task is to provide military expertise and support to the CSDP, 
including early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning of EU-led 
military crisis management operations.  
D. (RE) AFFIRMING NATO’S PRIMACY: THE BERLIN PLUS 
AGREEMENT 
Within only two years after Saint-Malo, CSDP had set up a basic 
framework for the scope and synthesis of its embryonic military force, and had 
established a fundamental chain of command to guide it: under the political 
supervision of PSC, and the military expertise of the EUMC and the EUMS, the 
ERRF would undertake the tasks described in the Petersberg declaration. The 
CSDP equation was lacking, though, two elements to be complete: the 
specialized military equipment necessary for the successful accomplishment of 
its high risk operations—such as peacemaking missions—and a reliable 
infrastructure to support them. The solution was given by NATO: under the Berlin 
Plus Agreement, signed between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002, 
CSDP was allowed to draw some of NATO’s assets for its own peacekeeping 
operations. Under these arrangements, the EU enjoys assured access to 
NATO’s planning, presumed access to NATO’s assets and capabilities, and a 
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pre-designed European-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), a European General. However, the 
implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements did not come without restrictions 
for the CSDP: not only does NATO maintain the “right of first refusal”; that is, 
NATO must first decline to intervene in a given crisis, but also, the approval of 
the use of assets has to be unanimous among NATO members.122  
The Berlin Plus agreement, asserted Greek fears that CSDP’s autonomy 
was merely a verbal promise. On the one hand, NATO’s “right of first refusal” 
limited CSDP’s action only to cases where NATO did not wish to be involved, 
essentially downgrading the EU to a second class security provider, that is, 
eligible only for the missions NATO would allow it to undertake. On the other 
hand, CSDP’s dependency on NATO introduced the very parameter that Greece 
was hoping to avoid: its frictions with fellow NATO-member Turkey. The 
repercussions of the Turkish-Greek frictions on the CSDP project became 
evident when Ankara’s attempt to negotiate a seat at the PSC was rejected by 
the EU: Turkey then used its membership of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to 
veto the “Berlin Plus” arrangement and thus block the CSDP’s right to use NATO 
capabilities.  
The deadlock created in EU-NATO relations after the Turkish veto, was 
initially treated by EU guarantees to Turkey on both nonaggression and 
consultation. Greece responded by vetoing these agreements and it was not until 
December 2002 that a solution to the dispute was finally negotiated: Ankara 
settled for the fullest possible involvement in the EU’s security and defense 
decision-shaping process and automatic involvement in the event of an EU 
mission using NATO assets. In addition, it was given a formal guarantee that (i) 
CSDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean, (ii) Cyprus, being not a 
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PfP123 member, would not be allowed to participate in EU operations, and (iii) the 
EU force would not attack a NATO member state. With an eye toward Cyprus 
and its path towards EU membership, Greece managed to negotiate a reciprocity 
of this clause, that a NATO member would not attack an EU member state; 
however, one of the major operational theaters that Athens was hoping to shield 
under the CSDP was lost: the ERRF would not deploy in the Aegean, leaving the 
defense of the Greek islands exclusively on Greek hands.  
The agreement that was finally reached—formally known as the “Ankara 
Document”—abruptly foiled Greece’s hopes by highlighting Greece’s misguided 
expectation that its national interests could be defended by a European military 
organization.124 The Ankara document was undoubtedly successful in putting an 
end to the two-year stand-off over the Berlin Plus arrangement; at the same time, 
however, it declared the EU’s determination to remain outside the politics of the 
Greek-Turkish tensions. Its proposal that “under no circumstances, nor in any 
crisis, will the CSDP be used against an Ally” was, to Greek eyes, a political 
assurance to Turkey that no EU force would intervene in “political disputes” 
between NATO allies. At the Brussels European Council of October 24–25, 2002, 
the Ankara text was replaced by the “Brussels Document,” which stated that 
“under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will CSDP be used against an (NATO) 
Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management 
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secured a—practically redundant—written pledge that no action would be 
undertaken that could violate the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.125 
E. THE EU MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE. 
Greece’s expectations for CSDP had been reawakened earlier that year. 
On July 18, 2002, a letter from the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt to his 
British and French counterparts reiterated the traditional Greek line of reasoning 
that embraced the need to “develop the solidarity between the member-states of 
the European Union, [which] could be done by means of a mutual security 
guarantee in the event of an attack calling for a collective response.”126 Although 
the letter on its own did not generate any related discussion in the EU, the 
critical—for Greece—issue of a mutual assistance clause aroused fierce 
passions within the 2003 EU’s Convention Working Group, which discussed the 
future of Europe in regards to defense and external action.  
Despite the clear disparity of views, the Group decided upon the 
introduction into the Constitutional Treaty draft of the EU127 (TCE) of both a 
solidarity clause, outlining procedures in the event of a terrorist attack, and an 
“opt-in,” whereby those member-states who wished to take over the mutual 
assistance commitments on the WEU Treaty should be authorized to do so within 
the framework of the Union.128 The proposals for a new formulation of the TCE 
paragraph on common defense that followed (re)affirmed the supremacy of 
NATO and suggested that those members that did not wish to await the 
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European Council’s decision on mutual defense should be allowed to anticipate 
it. Along with the detailed arrangements for participation in this cooperation, the 
convention proposals heightened Athens’ interest as they explicitly brought up 
the issue of armed aggression against EU soil. At the same time, though, the 
proposals drew intense opposition from both the euro-atlanticist and the euro-
continentalist member-states, as not only they lacked a robust framework, but 
also they remained unacceptable to both sides.129 The former group was 
suspicious of possible implications for NATO’s supremacy and the latter feared 
unwanted involvement despite the guarantees deriving from the “opt-in” 
mechanism. It thus came as no surprise that in the final Convention plenary 
process, twenty-four members from both groups, sponsored amendments to 
delete the mutual assistance clause altogether.  
Although promising for Greek interests, the proposals had more political 
symbolism than practical value, as three major elements remained prominently 
contentious: the voluntary nature of the participation, the vagueness covering the 
role of NATO, and the principle of anticipating the EU’s decision on common 
defense.130 In light of the disagreements between the euro-atlanticists and the 
euro-continentalists regarding the implications for NATO, the subsequent Italian 
presidency completely scrapped the detailed arrangements, along with the  
article itself.  However, the solidarity clause—in the event of a terrorist attack  
or a natural man-made disaster, along with its detailed implementation 
arrangements—remained unaffected in the August 2004 text, highlighting the 
EU’s hesitation to concentrate its focus on defense issues. This hesitation 
became more prominent in the body of the EU Lisbon Treaty, which entered into 
force on December 1, 2009. Among the various CSDP-related provisions, Greek 
interest was spurred by TEU Article 42 (7) on “Mutual Assistance Clause,” which 
                                            
129 The main point of contention between the euro-atlanticist and the euro-continentalist 
states is the primacy of NATO. For more on the euro-atlanticist and the euro-continentalist states 
within the EU and their position regarding NATO see: Arunas Molis, The Role and Interests of 
Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy. 
130 Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, 122. 
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specifically brought up the issue of EU action in case a member state is the 
victim of armed aggression against its territory131  
 
The Essential Content of the Provision 
The Main 





“Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill
higher criteria and which have made more binding
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the
most demanding missions shall establish permanent
structured cooperation within the Union framework.” 





“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defense policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be 
consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, which, for those States which are members of
it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the 
forum for its implementation.” 
TEU, Art. 42 (7) 
Solidarity 
Clause 
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit
of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist
attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.” 
TEU, Art. 222 
Possibility to 
entrust a Task 
to a group of 
member-states 
“The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the
Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to
protect the Union’s values and serve its interests … a group 
of Member States which are willing and have the necessary
capability for such a task.” 
TEU, Art. 42(5); 
TEU, Art. 44(1) 
Enhanced co-
operation 
“Member States which wish to establish enhanced
cooperation between themselves within the framework of the 
Union’s non-exclusive competences may make use of its
institutions and exercise those competences...”  
TEU, Art. 20;  
TEU, Art. 326-334
Table 1.   CSDP-Related Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty132  
                                            
131 The CSDP-related provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are summarized in Table 1.  
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With Greek insecurities deriving mainly from a potential offensive military 
action, a Clause on Mutual Assistance naturally arouses interest in Athens. 
Under TEU auspices, fellow member-states are now obliged to assist the victim 
of armed aggression by all the means in their power.133 On its face, the clause 
appears to address a large portion of Greece’s security concerns, particularly the 
territorial threat.  A more thorough study of its phrasing, however, reveals that 
among the five CSDP-related provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the Mutual 
Assistance Clause has the lowest implementation potential. The use of such 
abstract expressions as “obliged to assist” and “by all the means in their power” 
leaves vital semantic gaps in its interpretation. Does “obliged to” imply that a 
member-state that is not willing to assist a counterpart in need will face 
consequences? And what is the breadth of “all the means in its power”? Do these 
means include diplomatic mobilization, military assistance, or both? Without a 
legal framework precisely describing either the level of obligation or the extent of 
a member-state’s involvement in a fellow member-state’s armed dispute, the 
Mutual Assistance Clause remains deceptively promising.  
More important than the semantic gaps in its body, the potential of TEU 
Article 42 (7) is limited by two elements. The first pertains to the Petersberg 
tasks, according to which CSDP does not undertake missions related to 
collective defense. Thus, the resulting conflict between the CSDP framework and 
the Mutual Assistance Clause essentially cancels the latter.  The second refers to 
the non-duplication of NATO guideline, set by former U.S. Secretary of the State 
Madeleine Albright. Practically declaring collective defense to be the exclusive 
domain of NATO, the non-duplication guideline denies the EU the potential of 
collective defense action—which further renders the Mutual Assistance Clause 
an inactive provision.134 It is therefore not a coincidence that EU countries, 
                                            
132 Antti Kaski, The CSDP after Lisbon: Lost Opportunities or Changed Interests?, GCSP 
Policy Paper No 16, Geneva Center for Security Policy (Geneva: GCSP, June 2011), 2. 
133 TEU Article 42 (7), emphasis mine. 
134 This is even more the case as 21 of the EU members are NATO members as well; out of 
27 members, only Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus are not NATO members. 
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especially the older NATO-members, have hardly noted the Mutual Assistance 
Clause.135 What is more, for Athens, as long as the Brussels document casts its 
shadows on Greek hopes for a European response to a potential Turkish 
offensive, the Mutual Assistance Clause shall remain a dead letter.  
In this context, the fact that the current focus of the CSDP is the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Solidarity Clause is 
indicative of EU’s determination to abstain from developing the defense 
dimension of an initially otherwise promising CSDP. PESCO, on the one hand, is 
not related to any aspect of defense; in essence, it aims at bringing together 
European defense suppliers and strengthening the European defense markets 
and research, development, and industrial base against competition from the 
United States. The Solidarity Clause, on the other hand, refers exclusively to 
terrorist attack and natural or man-made disaster—in other words to the security 
dimension of the CSDP.  
The EU’s choice to focus its military and civilian capacity on security and 
not defense is further manifested in two major domains of EU policy.  The first 
refers to the security doctrine of the CSDP, the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), which essentially declares defense, in its traditional concept of military 
confrontation, to be outside the CSDP mindset. The second pertains to the EU’s 
decision to deploy Frontex, the border-control security body of the CSDP, along 
the Greek-Turkish borders in Thrace to counter the increasing illegal immigration 
waves entering Greek mainland.  
1. European Security Strategy (ESS) 
The first official EU document dedicated to formulating a common 
European security strategy is not a single document. It comprises of a 2003 
document entitled European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better 
                                            
135 Antti Kaski, The CSDP after Lisbon: Lost Opportunities or Changed Interests?, 2. 
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World136 and the 2007 report on the implementation of it,137 which reviews the 
effectiveness of the 2003 ESS, particularly in the light of lessons learned from 
missions conducted in the framework of the ESDP. This documentational dyad 
constitutes the first written attempt of the EU to identify in a single document the 
global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarify its 
strategic objectives in dealing with them. 
The 2003 document comprises of three parts. The first describes Europe’s 
perception of its security environment and lists five issues that the EU identifies 
as key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
regional conflicts—both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, state failure, and 
organized crime. The second part sets the framework for CSDP’s strategic 
objectives, namely building security in the European neighborhood and 
establishing an international order based on “effective multilateralism,” that is 
efficient cooperation with the international community.138 The third part 
addresses the policy implications for Europe: more capability, further coherency, 
and effective cooperation with partners. 
The implementation report of 2008 constitutes exactly what its name 
promises: an assessment of the ESS efficiency during the six-year period since 
its launch. The report is also structured in three chapters: the first, which shares 
a title with the 2003 document, brings into the CSDP realm the issues of cyber-
security, energy security, and climate change. The next chapter evaluates the 
ESS stability-building project “in Europe and beyond” and introduces the 
elements of piracy and small arms and light weapons. The report concludes by 
                                            
136 European Union, “European Union External Action,” Consilium Europa, December 12, 
2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed December 21, 
2010). 
137 European Union, “European Union External Action,” Consilium Europa, December 11, 
2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf 
(accessed December 21, 2010). 
138 The most basic definition of multilateralism is presented by Robert Keohane, who defined 
multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.” 
Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal (Canadian 
International Council) 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 731–764. For a detailed analysis on the concept 
of multilateralism, see: John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution,” 
International Organization (The MIT Press) 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 561–598. 
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asserting the need to develop greater engagement with neighbors and partners 
in the rapidly changing environment of the globalized world. 
Contrary to the traditional format of analogous documents, the ESS sets 
no clear outline with regard to a realm of responsibility for the EU to defend. At 
the same time that it identifies its vital area as the “European neighborhood,” it 
explicitly states its aim to “share responsibility for global security.”139 Limited in 
breadth within the Petersberg tasks framework, the ESS focuses its rhetoric on 
the internal, rather than external security of the EU. The key threats listed in the 
2002 document are indicative of this orientation. Out of the five key threats listed, 
only regional conflict could potentially constitute a direct external hazard requiring 
defensive measures; however, the ESS explicitly identifies the hazard for Europe 
not in the form of military confrontation, but by means of regional instability 
spilling over into Europe. The very introductory phrase of the key threats 
paragraph reads: “Large-scale aggression against any member-state is now 
improbable….  Europe faces new threats, which are more diverse, less visible 
and less predictable.” The defensive insecurities of Athens, deriving mainly from 
a potential Turkish aggression, are clearly outside the ESS scope. 
The security orientation in the spirit of the 2002 document is preserved in 
the implementation report, which asserts not only the non-combative nature of 
Europe’s threat environment, but also its determination to address it with soft-
power means. Among them, the ESS recognizes “effective multilateralism” as the 
heart of its policy. As a result, the CSDP does not view the use of military power, 
even for defense reasons, as the default instrument for short-term prevention and 
crisis management, although the Strategy does not explicitly declare it an 
instrument of last resort. Aware of its limited military potential, and careful not to 
upset the delicate Euro-Atlantic balance, the ESS remains skillfully vague, 
essentially asserting that collective territorial defense continues to be the 
exclusive domain of NATO. 
                                            
139 European Union, “European Union External Action,” Consilium Europa, December 12, 




Established in 2004 by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, and 
operational since 2005, Frontex is a coordinating mechanism of the European 
Union, under the jurisdiction of the CSDP. The official mission of Frontex is “to 
help EU member-states implement EU rules on external border controls and to 
coordinate operational cooperation between member-states in the field of 
external border management.” It is responsible for co-coordinating the activities 
of the national border guards to ensure the security of the EU’s borders with non-
member-states. To this end, Frontex combines in a single body tasks and 
activities that most EU member-states have kept separate. There is an 
intelligence service component, actively monitoring the external borders of the 
EU, so that predictions to movements of migration can be made.140 A separate 
research division cooperates with military industries and universities on projects 
such as enhancing the real-time surveillance of the borders or the introduction of 
biometric identity checks at all border crossings. Another project is the 
introduction of biometric identity checks at all border crossings. 
Since the agency became operational, Frontex has organized “joint 
operations,” in which an EU member-state can invite other EU member-states to 
send border guard personnel and equipment for joint border policing. Because 
the closure of other routes to Europe (i.e., West Africa to Spain, Libya to 
Italy/Malta) has presently made Greece the presently last remaining gateway to 
the EU, Greece officially requested Frontex assistance in 2011. EU response 
was rapid. Merely five days after receiving the request, Frontex finalized 
arrangements for human and technical resources to be deployed to the Greek-
Turkish land border in the region of Orestiada and neighboring areas. 
Frontex has thus far attempted to assist Greek authorities with illegal 
immigration on two levels. The first included efforts to integrate Turkey into the 
border regime by involving the Turkish coast guard and the Turkish border 
                                            
140 This task, which is referred to as risk analysis, is the object of a whole department at 
Frontex’s headquarters in Warsaw. 
 62
authority in joint maneuvers. The EU has been negotiating a readmission 
agreement for many years with Turkey—so far without success. Such an 
agreement could force Turkey to readmit not only nationals, but also all irregular 
migrants who can be proved to have entered Greece and the EU via Turkey. 
However, Ankara is not complying with the already existing bilateral readmission 
agreement with Greece, so it is highly improbable that negotiations with the EU 
will prove fruitful. On a second level, Frontex aims to reinforce the border controls 
between Greece and Turkey, both at the land border in the Evros region as well 
as between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos 
and Rhodos. While maintaining its focus on intercepting and detaining illegal 
immigrants, Frontex attempts to establish a chain of evidence (e.g., footage from 
helicopters, portraits of those intercepted, protocols of interception) for all 
migrants to be able to present to the Turkish authorities an irrefutable claim that 
they did actually come from Turkey and are thus eligible for deportation under the 
readmission agreement.  
Regardless of its actual efficiency,141 the deployment of Frontex in the 
Greek-Turkish borders shows the EU’s determination to deal with the civilian 
aspects of its members’ security considerations. By applying broad-based socio-
technical intervention techniques in the countries of origin and transit, the EU 
declares its perception of illegal immigration as a moral obligation. This view, 
prominent throughout the ESS, also fits seamlessly into the EU’s activism in the 
realm of human rights: although the image of the boat refugees could serve to 
justify a certain degree of militarization of the borders, the CSDP rejects militant 
approaches. Instead of permitting or enforcing close border rules, the EU 
chooses to integrate border management into a larger concept of “migration and 
development” policy. This choice, which affirms the humanitarian orientation of 
                                            
141 Reports from Frontex suggest that there has been a 44 percent decrease in crossings in 
this region since the additional border patrol agents were deployed in November 2010; on 
average two hundred forty five persons a day were reported crossing in to Greece in October 
2010. 
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the CSDP, is reflected in the EU’s negative stance on Greek proposal of building 











                                            
142 Initially, Greece had planned for a 206 kilometers fence along the entirety of the border 
with Turkey; however, criticisms from the EU and human rights groups apparently necessitated a 
drastic change of plans. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A thorough assessment of the CSDP project renders clear that it was not 
created to address territorial concerns—of Greece or any other EU state. Its 
emergence owed, in large part, to the absence of suitable existing alternatives for 
European security and defense. On the one hand the WEU was politically, 
militarily and institutionally too weak to act as a functional interface between the 
EU and the Atlantic Alliance; on the other hand, NATO had failed to convince its 
European partners that it remained the key security instrument for a world rapidly 
unfolding after the end of the Cold War. Unlike NATO, however, CSDP is not a 
response to a sense of existential threat hanging over Europe. Consequently, its 
spirit and instruments are crafted for the task of “crisis management” rather than 
military deterrence or robust armed intervention. Although the term “crisis 
management” does not exclude the deployment of combat troops,143 the 
reasoning for such a deployment would—according to the ESS auspices—be 
strictly firefighting in nature, to suit the Petersberg tasks framework. In this 
context, the CSDP can be more accurately described as a policy area akin to risk 
management and not to countering any territorial threat.  
With the CSDP lacking a conceptual point of reference to define itself 
around, analogous to the one NATO identified in the communist threat during the 
Cold War, it comes as no surprise that the CSDP’s strategic document, the ESS, 
resembles more a description than a strategy. Yet, although ESS is indeed more 
a concept than a security doctrine, it does not lack the essence of the latter. 
Because the EU has no clear adversary, the ESS is not—and could not be—an 
actual security strategy in the narrow sense of the term. As the essence of 
strategy, however, boils down to a question of the extent to which any 
instruments of power—military or non-military—further a strategic actor’s 
perceived interests, military power cannot be perceived as strategic per se. It is 
                                            
143 Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, 10. 
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the linking of military power to political purpose that defines the strategic element. 
Hence, ESS’s focus on soft-power and civilian-orientated operations, rather than 
classical power politics, does not render it necessarily less strategic than the 
manifestly more defense orientated national doctrines. 
Either way, what matters in strategic terms for Athens, is (i) whether the 
CSDP embraces Greek security interests, and (ii) whether it has the capacity to 
generate relevant capabilities (means), to defend these interests.144  The first 
part of the query is answered in the very introduction of the ESS: “Europe has 
never been so prosperous, so secure, so free.”145 Contrary to the aggressive 
image that Greece holds of its neighbors, the strategy explicitly declares that 
large-scale aggression against any member-state is improbable.146 Naturally, the 
policy document that guides the European Union's security strategy cannot 
reflect the security considerations of each of the twenty-seven member-states. 
However, the rift between the security concerns of Greece and the spirit of the 
ESS is not merely linguistic, but deeply structural. As Chapter II shows, Athens’ 
apprehensions are territorial in nature and thus completely outside the ESS 
scope. Beyond the documents, this strategic rift is also echoed in the broader 
CSDP project. 
The second part of the query—that is, whether the CSDP has the actual 
capacity to cover Greek expectations—has three interdependent elements. The 
first is the CSDP’s dependency on NATO assets and structures. Reflected in 
institutional terms by the Berlin Plus Agreement, EU’s reliance on NATO is not 
limited to structures, mechanisms, and assets; it extends to the level of initiative. 
Under the auspices of Berlin Plus, not only will any military operations envisaged 
                                            
144 This definition of a strategic actor reflects the central ends-means instrumentality of 
strategy and corresponds to Gunnar Sjöstedt’s general definition of an international actor as one 
that has the capacity for goal-oriented behavior towards other international actors. See Gunnar 
Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977). 
145 European Union, “European Union External Action,” Consilium Europa, December 12, 
2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed December 21, 
2010), 1. 
146 Ibid, 3. 
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by the EU be conducted consistent with NATO policy and doctrine, but also, in 
accordance with NATO’s right of first refusal, the EU may act only if NATO first 
decides not to. The situation for Greece is further complicated by the fact that 
Athens’ major security concern (Turkey) is a member of the very organization 
with which the CSDP is supposed to cooperate. In this context, Turkey’s blocking 
of the Berlin Plus process in Laeken, serves as a reminder that unless the EU 
obtains adequate autonomous military capabilities, Greek expectations of the 
CSDP or any similar European security scheme can be permanently jeopardized.  
The second element refers to the military tasks that the EU is empowered 
to take. Contrary to Greek hopes, the Petersberg tasks do not address collective 
security, but cover tasks of strictly humanitarian, peacekeeping, and 
peacemaking nature. Athens’ resentment does not imply any kind of neglect for 
the nature of the Petersberg tasks. Quite the opposite is true, as Greece is a 
strong supporter of all initiatives in this direction, a support proven by its 
enthusiastic support of all operations of this nature.147 Its disappointment is 
generated by its unfulfilled quest for a security provider determined to embrace 
the territorial nature of its national security concerns. With its northern neighbors 
(FYROM and Albania) cultivating irredentism and its Eastern neighbor (Turkey) 
openly coveting part of its land, Athens seeks a security community that is 
determined to assist in defending its interests.  So far, it has found none. 
The third element pertains to the actual military potential of the EU. The 
structure and strength of the ERRF set at Helsinki confirm that the CSDP does 
not aim to become a military superpower, or a “European Army” responsible for 
the territorial defense of the European landmass—far more, that of Greece.  
Among the major Greek security concerns—Albania, FYROM, Turkey, 
and illegal immigration—CSDP has the capacity to address only the latter. 
Regardless of their real or perceived magnitude, the first three issues do not fall 
                                            
147 Out of the twelve ongoing CSDP operations Greece takes part in the following: Operation 
EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Anti-piracy naval operation off the coast of Somalia 
(ATALANTA), EU Mission on the Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), Police mission in 
Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). 
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under the Petersberg tasks and are therefore not eligible for CSDP action. On 
the other hand, EU’s initiative to deploy Frontex along the Greek-Turkish borders 
demonstrates eloquently the civilian nature of the CSDP, as the nature of Frontex 
is non-military. The rapid deployment of the force (merely five days after 
receiving the request from Athens) as well as its border-police nature, confirm the 
paper’s initial claim that the CSDP will only address Greek national security 
concerns that do not entail a European military response. Contrary to a promising 
defense dimension, ambitiously proclaimed within its very name, CSDP is not, 
and does not aspire to be a defense alliance. Rather, it can be perceived as a 
capacity, mostly political and civilian, whose infant military dimension simply 
extends the range of instruments at the EU’s disposal for essential crisis 
management operations.148 With Greece’s defensive concerns requiring mainly 
deterrent, and not crisis-management actions, the current CSDP design proves 
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